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ABSTRACT 
Researcher: Isaac Nderitu Munene 
Title: SAFETY RETURN ON INVESTMENT (ROI): THE BROADER 
ADOPTION OF ROTORCRAFT CFIT-AVOIDANCE TECHNOLOGY 
  
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation 
Year: 2018 
This dissertation provided a method of estimating the potential return on investment 
(ROI) that could be achieved if operators were to adopt the readily available controlled 
flight into terrain (CFIT) avoidance technology more broadly.  Previous research 
explored the costs and benefits of different safety initiatives but did not evaluate from an 
operators’ perspective.  For the operators, a private ROI that excludes societal costs and 
benefits was therefore considered the suitable metric.  For the rotorcraft industry, the ROI 
estimation methodology was not readily available, and this study sought to fill that gap.  
The purpose of this study was to estimate the potential ROI by determining the costs 
associated with the outcomes of CFIT-accidents, the costs of adopting the technology, the 
current accident rate, the benefits expressed as costs avoided through a reduction in the 
number of accidents, and application of the appropriate ROI formula.  
The dissertation was conducted as a mixed method study that used qualitative data 
from historical CFIT-related accident reports to identify the accident outcomes and 
estimate the associated accident costs plus the available quantitative data to estimate the 
CFIT-avoidance technology adoption costs.  The accident cost categories were based on 
categories used in airline research and modified for the rotorcraft industry.  Using the 
formula, ROI = Net benefits divided by safety technology adoption costs, ROI values 
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were generated in multiple iterations of the Monte Carlo simulation.  The net benefits 
were evaluated as the difference between the potential accident costs avoided with a 
reduction in CFIT accidents and the technology adoption costs.   
 The simulation results for the three rotorcraft categories showed that the turbine-
single would experience the highest ROI, followed by the piston category and the twin-
turbines.  When all rotorcraft categories were considered, the ROI was positive but could 
turn negative if the technology adoption costs grew by a factor of more than three.  The 
broad range in the ROI values for both the piston and single-turbine categories were 
largely driven by the high variation of the individual cost categories, especially the direct 
costs: occupant death and injuries, aircraft damage, and leasing costs. 
 From the results of the study, it was recommended that CFIT-avoidance 
technology should be more broadly adopted by piston and single-turbine rotorcraft 
operators.  For twin-turbines, the adoption should be evaluated against the impact of the 
regulatory changes for helicopter air ambulance (HAA) operations, which may reduce the 
number of accidents and generate a positive ROI before further action from operators.  
Future research should focus on validating the methodology by using it as a starting point 
for evaluating the ROI for safety initiatives that have already been implemented, whether 
technology or operational programs.  The industry should also improve the methodology 
by defining or proposing better processes for estimating rotorcraft accident costs, 
especially indirect costs estimated to be the of the same magnitude as the direct costs.  
The rotorcraft industry should find ways to make costs data, such as accident 
investigation costs, more accessible in order to apply the ROI estimation methodology to 
achieve more accurate results.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In his commentary in the America Helicopter Society (AHS) International’s 
March/April 2015 issue of Vertiflite, the long-term Executive Director, Michael 
Hirschberg, reiterated the need for civil helicopter operators to adopt technologies that 
are certified, readily available, and affordable in order to mitigate most of the top safety 
issues.  He emphasized five core technologies: (1) Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning 
Systems (EGPWS)/ Helicopter Terrain Awareness Warning Systems (HTAWS), (2) 
flight data monitoring devices, (3) helicopter operations monitoring program systems, (4) 
radar altimeters for light helicopters, and (5) onboard aircraft performance monitoring 
and calculating systems.  As an industry leader, he was emphasizing the findings of the 
study by the European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST) which listed the 15 “highly 
promising” technologies that could potentially mitigate most of the safety issues facing 
the helicopter industry (National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR), 2014).   
The Specialist Team Technology (ST Technology), a sub-team of the European 
Helicopter Safety Implementation Team, was created to assess the potential of different 
technologies to mitigate the safety issues identified by the European Helicopter Safety 
Analysis Team (EHSAT).  The EHSAT analyzed more than 300 accidents and identified 
the different accident / incident causes and contributing factors referred to as the Standard 
Problem Statements (SPSs).  The team developed a tool and used it to link the different 
technologies to the SPSs, and using a scoring or rating system, determined the most 
advantageous technology for each safety issue.  Two rating elements, Impact and 
Applicability were used.  Impact was a measure of how well the given technology could 
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mitigate the specific SPS, and Applicability was a measure of whether the said 
technology could be utilized for a specific SPS at its current technology readiness level 
and cost.  Due to the large number of SPSs identified, only the Top 20 were considered.  
The technologies were rated as: slightly promising, moderately promising, and highly 
promising.  According to the National Aerospace Laboratory (2014), of the 15 highly 
promising technologies, five are promising in mitigating the mission risk presented by 
terrain or obstacles: 
i) Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System / Terrain Awareness and Warning 
System (EGPWS/TAWS) 
 System provides warnings of obstacle hazards such as ground and towers.  
ii) Laser Radar Obstacle and Terrain Avoidance System  
 System uses an eye-safe laser capable of detecting objects as thin as wires, 
thus making it useful for wire strike prevention.  
iii)  Digital Map  
 System displays digital maps with elevation and obstacle information.  
iv) Passive Tower-based Obstacle Collision Avoidance System  
 Units located on utility and power line towers detect air traffic entering a 
predefined warning zone and activate warning lights to illuminate the 
tower and do not require any installations in the helicopter.  
v) Radar Altimeter for Altitude Measurement  
 System for small helicopters, consisting of one single unit containing both 
transmitter and receiver antennas as well as processing unit.  
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Though these technologies are readily available to operators, adopting them 
requires the investment of additional resources beyond the initial aircraft acquisition costs 
for aircraft already in service.  For operators, the decision to invest resources in safety 
relies heavily on their ability to build a credible business case for it, thus the need for an 
evaluation of the return on investment (ROI) or cost-benefit analysis.   
As the competitiveness in the global business environment continues to intensify, 
executives are evaluating the contribution of their individual products, services, and 
programs to the overall corporate fiscal performance.  The executives’ goal is to identify 
factors that impede or enhance productivity and growth.  Safety performance and 
management has been identified as a critical factor to an organization’s reliability, 
reputation, operational effectiveness, fiscal performance, and competitiveness 
(Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, & Vázquez-Ordás, 2009; Flight Safety Foundation, 
2012).  According to Porter and Kramer (2006), in the automotive industry, Volvo has 
actively chosen to make vehicle safety a central element of its competitive position, while 
Toyota has done the same with the environmental safety benefits of its hybrid 
technology.  Rotorcraft manufacturers, through the introduction of different safety 
technologies, have sought to gain the same competitive advantage over their counterparts 
while reducing the occurrence of aircraft incidents and accidents.  The adoption of these 
technologies is therefore important to the manufacturers and the industry as a whole. 
Rotorcraft Safety  
Rotorcraft safety continues to be a major concern for the aviation industry.  The 
importance of addressing this subject is highlighted by the National Transportation Safety 
Board’s (NTSB) action of placing the enhancement of public helicopter safety on its 
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Most Wanted List of 2015 (NTSB, 2015).  The International Helicopter Safety Team 
(IHST) was set up in late 2005 by government regulators, manufacturers, and helicopter 
operators with the goal of reducing the number of global helicopter accidents by 80 
percent by 2016 and eventually to zero (U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team, 
2011). 
Controlled flight into terrain.  A Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) is defined 
as an accident where an aircraft in good working condition, while still under the control 
of the crew, is unintentionally flown into terrain, man-made obstacles, or water, with no 
prior awareness on the part of the crew of the impending collision (Ishihara, 2005).  In a 
study of the helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) CFIT accidents between 
1992 and 2004, Ishihara (2005) observed that 84% of the accidents occurred during night 
time, 58% in visual meteorological conditions (VMC), 80% during the cruise phase, and 
79% involved terrain.  The reduction of CFIT accidents requires the industry 
understanding the extent of the problem, proposing mitigation solutions, and adopting the 
said solutions.   
 A 2015 White Paper was prepared for the rotorcraft industry by the Helicopter 
Association International (HAI), the AHS International, General Aviation Manufacturers 
Association (GAMA), and Aircraft Electronics Association as a proposal to modify the 
requirements of Part 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 27 single-engine instrument 
flight rules (IFR) certification.  The team observed that during the period between 2001 
and 2013, Part 27 single-engine helicopters across the world were involved in 194 
accidents related to inadvertent flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) or 
CFIT with 133 resulting in fatalities.  Over the same period, multi-engine Part 27 or Part 
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29 rotorcraft worldwide were involved in 54 accidents related to IMC, CFIT, or IFR with 
40 resulting in fatalities.  According to the NTSB, 60 percent of all CFIT accidents are 
fatal (Sandel Avionics, 2012).  
The U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team (JHSAT) (2011) has observed 
that in the 523 U.S. registered helicopter accidents occurring in calendar years 2000, 
2001, and 2006, a pilot’s decision to continue Visual Flight Rules (VFR) when 
indications of deteriorating weather were presented frequently resulted in the pilot 
entering inadvertent IMC.  Accidents that occurred after continued flight in such 
marginal or deteriorated weather conditions were commonly a result of a collision with 
obstacles or terrain.  When operating in a low altitude environment, the inability to detect 
wires as well as the loss of situational awareness was also observed as a problem that 
resulted in inadequate clearance from the ground and strikes to trees and obstacles in the 
rotorcraft’s flight path. 
In a 2006 report, the NTSB concluded that for 17 of the 55 accidents it 
considered, the pilots might have avoided terrain if TAWS was installed.  It further 
concluded that the use of TAWS would enhance the safety of emergency medical 
services (EMS) operations in night and adverse weather conditions by helping prevent 
CFIT accidents.  The NTSB issued the Safety Recommendation A-06-15, proposing the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) require EMS operators to install TAWS and 
ensure their flight crews are capable of using it.  In 2008, the FAA published Technical 
Standards Order C194, Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System, in readiness 
for the rulemaking process for EMS TAWS requirements to start (NTSB, 2009). 
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 By the end of 2008, the NTSB realized the safety recommendation on TAWS 
would not be adequate as the number of accidents began to rise again after the reduction 
achieved between 2004 and 2007.  For flight safety improvements to be realized, a final 
rule mandating the installation and use of TAWS in air medical services flights would 
therefore be required.  In April 2009, before the House Committee of Transportation and 
Infrastructure, then FAA Director of Flight Standards, John Allen, announced that the 
agency had initiated the formal rule-making process to address this issue (FAA, 2009a).  
In 2012, the FAA released guidance outlining the technical requirements for the 
installation of TAWS on all HEMS aircraft, now more commonly referred to as 
helicopter air ambulance (HAA), and in 2014 the final rule was released (FAA, 2014a).   
In February 2014, the FAA made amendments to the Title 14 CFR Parts 91, 120, 
and 135 introducing new requirements for the HAA operators, commercial helicopters, 
and Part 91 helicopter operations.  Under Part 135 rotorcraft operations, each HAA 
rotorcraft is to be equipped with a radio altimeter, HTAWS, and flight data monitoring 
system.  Additionally, the pilots must be instrument rating holders and can demonstrate 
their capability of maneuvering the aircraft safely out of inadvertent instrument 
meteorological weather conditions (FAA, 2014a).  In May 2014, the FAA released 
Advisory Circulars 27-1B Change 4 and 29-2C Change 4 to formalize the requirements 
for the installation of the equipment on all HAA operations aircraft (FAA, 2014b; FAA, 
2014c). 
According to the FAA, by 2014 there were 75 air ambulance companies operating 
approximately 1,515 helicopters in the United States.  Since 2004, the FAA has been 
promoting different initiatives to reduce HAA accidents after determining that 62 
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accidents, which resulted in 125 fatalities between 1991 and 2010 could have been 
mitigated by adopting the technologies mandated in 2014.  This number did not include 
accidents involving non-HAA commercial helicopters.  From 2011 through 2013, a total 
of 16 helicopter accidents resulting in 39 fatalities occurred (FAA, 2014d).  The number 
of accidents is an indication of why the FAA and the IHST emphasize the need for a 
faster adoption of different safety technologies within the whole industry. 
Return on Investment (ROI)  
Improving rotorcraft safety requires cooperation between the government and the 
industry, which is made up of rotorcraft manufacturers and operators.  The government 
improves safety by enhancing safety regulations, while the industry develops the required 
technologies to satisfy those regulatory requirements.  As stated earlier, the adoption of 
CFIT-avoidance technology will require the investment of financial resources beyond the 
initial aircraft acquisition and current operational costs for aircraft already in service.  
The decision to invest resources in safety requires the equipment manufacturers, 
operators, or government to understand the economic value of doing so.  A cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) or an ROI analysis can facilitate the decision making (Stone, 2005).  
Selecting the best method for making the assessment is based on the perspective and 
goals of the party performing the analysis. 
A CBA, also known as a benefit-cost analysis, is an examination of the costs 
associated with the implementation of projects or activities and the benefits realized from 
them.  All costs and benefits are examined regardless of who bore the costs or realized 
the benefits: the producer, the consumer, or a third party.  The comparison is made in the 
same unit of measurement, usually a monetary unit like dollars.  A CBA can be used to 
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evaluate different programs or solutions to determine the one for which the benefits 
exceed the costs and allocate the resources accordingly.  Performing this type of analysis 
can become difficult when identifying and valuing the benefits (FAA, 1998; Guzman & 
Asgari, 2014).  For government outputs, through regulation or otherwise, a CBA may 
prove to be adequate for the purpose of evaluating the alternatives, but since they are not 
sold under market conditions, their value to consumers, the benefits they provide, become 
difficult to determine (FAA, 1998).  It is therefore necessary to identify how the benefits 
are to be determined and evaluated for each specific CBA.  A CBA as a public sector 
investment appraisal approach that provides information to decision-makers on the 
economic viability of different alternatives and their benefits to the community (Civil 
Aviation Safety Authority, 2010) differs from an ROI analysis that focuses on private 
investments.   
ROI, by definition, is the ratio of gain to investment and measures the return, cost 
savings, profit, or cost avoidance that result from a given use of money (Feldman, 
Jazouli, & Sandborn, 2009).  ROI is the monetary benefit derived from having spent 
money on developing, changing, or managing a product or system.  It is an economic 
measure used to evaluate the efficiency of an investment (Chang, Sandborn, Pecht, Yung, 
& Wang, 2015).  An ROI analysis is also considered to be a type of CBA conducted from 
an investor’s perspective (Stone, 2005).  Westerlind (2004) suggests that an ROI analysis 
can be used as a financial measurement to develop a company’s business case and 
increase management and investor confidence.  According to Banks, Reichard, Crow, and 
Nickell (2009), individuals in the Prognostic and Health Management (PHM) technology 
field usually reference the reduced maintenance costs, increased operational availability, 
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and improved safety based on anecdotal evidence to respond to prospective customers’ 
questions on the benefits of implementing the technology.  They suggest that such an 
answer only provides an understanding of the practical benefits but not a justification for 
investing in the equipment, and an ROI analysis would be appropriate.  
It has been observed that the adoption of a voluntary safety improvement process 
such as a Safety Management System (SMS) that increases business costs, depends on 
the proposer’s ability to demonstrate its economic viability.  Though the implementation 
costs of such programs or processes can be easily identified, the benefits can be more 
difficult to identify and quantify, as there is no one accepted approach or standard for the 
aviation industry.  Industry leaders therefore need to be incentivized to adopt solutions 
like SMS through the application of generally accepted economic models in the valuation 
of the output or benefits (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).  The adoption of CFIT-
avoidance equipment, beyond the HAA operations, is voluntary and therefore requires 
the identification and quantification of the expected benefits.  Canada’s Department of 
Transport used a CBA when making the case for amending the regulatory requirements 
to expand the adoption of TAWS equipped with Enhanced Altitude Accuracy function to 
all private turbine-powered and commercial aircraft with six or more passenger seats.  
According to the Department of Transport, this action would cost $59 million and 
provide $216 million in benefits by avoiding additional safety costs with a reduction in 
CFIT accidents.  The effort was expected to yield a net benefit of $157 million over a 10-
year implementation period (Department of Transport, 2011).  If this change was not 
mandated for operators, understanding the ROI would have been critical in determining 
whether to voluntarily adopt the technology.  For rotorcraft operators, an ROI analysis 
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can provide some insight into the financial implications of broadly adopting the CFIT-
avoidance technology.  
A review of available aviation safety literature indicated that a gap exists on 
models or methods used for performing an ROI analysis for the adoption of a given 
aircraft technology or equipment as a safety intervention.  Research emphasis has been on 
safety management systems or programs (Lercel, Steckel, Mondello, Carr, & Patankar, 
2011; Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Figlock, 2000; Taylor, 2000).  Of the research performed, 
the CBA which considers the public costs and benefits was the method of choice.  
Examples include a CBA on accident safety costs for airline aircraft (Cavka & Cokorilo, 
2012), airport security (Stewart & Mueller, 2013), aviation security (Stewart & Mueller, 
2014), and the U.K. offshore helicopter industry (Mitchell, 2006).  For broader adoption 
of CFIT-avoidance technology, going beyond the CBA and performing an ROI analysis 
that considers the private costs and benefits can facilitate decision making for the 
industry (operators and helicopter manufacturers) who are likely to invest in the required 
resources.  
Significance of the Study 
For close to a decade, as previously stated, the 80% reduction of helicopter 
accidents has been a key objective of the IHST.  The NTSB, FAA, and European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) have worked closely as partners toward the 
improvement of aviation safety across the globe.  They have continued to highlight the 
need to accelerate the adoption rate of safety technology in order to reduce the number of 
accidents.  The FAA has used mandates to facilitate the adoption of the technology in 
some operations such as the HAA, but a gap exists when other operations are considered.  
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This study sought to provide operators and rotorcraft manufacturers (the industry) with a 
method of estimating the potential ROI that can be achieved when the industry is in the 
process of making the decision to voluntarily adopt rotorcraft safety technologies.  For 
this study, the ROI was considered from the rotorcraft manufacturers’ and operators’ 
perspective, as they will be actively investing financial resources for the integration of the 
technology into the fielded fleet.  Rotorcraft manufacturers were also to be considered 
operators as they are involved in flight training and flight test operations.  The ROI 
methodology applied in this study can be used in the future to evaluate whether new or 
existing technologies, like those identified in the NLR (2014) report, provide a ROI for 
those investing the resources to implement them.  The results of an ROI analysis can 
facilitate better and timely decision making and justification of resource allocation, 
planning, and implementation of safety improvements by the industry.  
Statement of the Problem 
 Improving safety within any industry requires the investment of various resources 
that come with financial implications for the organizations involved.  Research has 
shown that organizations focusing on the well-being and safety of their workforce by 
building a culture of health yield a greater value for their investors (Fabius, Thayer, 
Konicki, Yarborough, Peterson, Isaac, Loeppke, Eisenburg, & Dreger, 2013).  
Additionally, safety is considered an indicator of an organization’s performance, such as 
enhancing product quality and plant performance.  Improving safety or the perception of 
improving safety could be good business (Veltri, Pagell, Behm, & Das, 2007).  
To improve rotorcraft safety, resources must be invested, and organizations are 
expected to show the added value for their benefactors or investors.  Existing research 
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does not provide a methodology of estimating the potential ROI when aircraft equipment 
or technology is adopted by operators.  To encourage the adoption of the CFIT-avoidance 
technology beyond the HAA operations, the researcher will explore the ROI that could 
potentially be achieved with the implementation of the safety recommendations issued by 
the NTSB in 2005 and in line with the recent mandates issued for HAA operations.  An 
ROI is a suitable metric by which the industry can determine if an investment in the 
broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology is advisable.  Since the operators 
(customers) and rotorcraft manufacturers would be considered investors in this case, a 
private ROI analysis would be suitable, where the tangible financial benefits are 
considered.  The societal benefits are usually considered when a CBA is being 
performed.  A private ROI excludes costs and benefits where the public (society) and the 
government are the sole beneficiaries (Landau, Weisbrod & Alstadt, 2010).  Taylor 
(2000) provides an example of a private ROI by evaluating the different approaches of 
implementing maintenance resource management (MRM) concepts by an airline.  The 
benefits and costs considered did not include those external to the organization (societal).  
For the rotorcraft industry, gaps exist in ROI estimation techniques related to the 
adoption of safety technology (especially for the CFIT-avoidance technology) and 
understanding of the financial impact of the operators opting to voluntarily adopt the 
technology.  The focus of existing research has been mostly on CBAs, and this study 
sought to provide a method of performing the ROI analysis.   
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study was to estimate the potential ROI that could be achieved 
if the readily available CFIT-avoidance technology was more widely adopted by the 
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helicopter industry using actual helicopter accidents and the safety costs associated with 
their outcomes.  The study estimated the ROI likely to be achieved with the broader 
adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology by: 
i. Determining and evaluating the costs associated with accidents of 
different helicopter categories including, but not limited to: loss of aircraft, 
damage to aircraft, loss of crew and passengers, accident investigation 
costs, loss of investment, and crew replacement costs; 
ii. Determining and evaluating costs associated with adoption of the CFIT-
avoidance technology including: equipment acquisition, installation, 
training, and lifecycle support (sustainment); 
iii. Determining the CFIT accident rate (probability of occurrence) by 
helicopter category;  
iv. Determining and evaluating the benefits associated with the accident costs 
likely to be avoided as a result of the adoption of the CFIT-avoidance 
technology for operators and rotorcraft manufacturers; and,  
v. Applying the appropriate formula to estimate the ROI likely to be 
achieved with the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology. 
Research Questions 
The research involved the application of an appropriate financial formula to estimate 
the potential ROI that can be achieved with the broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance 
technology within the rotorcraft industry.  The ROI was estimated from the rotorcraft 
manufacturers’ and operators’ perspective for they would bear the responsibility of 
investing resources when equipping their respective aircraft.  Manufacturers were 
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considered investors based on their involvement in rotorcraft operations for development, 
production, and training purposes.  For this study, the accidents examined occurred 
between January 2005 and December 2015, the period since EGPWS/TAWS for 
rotorcraft became available (Kraemer, 2002).  The research addressed the following 
questions: 
a) What are the estimated costs likely to be experienced by rotorcraft operators 
as a result of a CFIT accident? 
b) How can operators estimate the potential ROI for the broader adoption of 
safety technology such as the CFIT-avoidance technology? 
c) Do the ROI results support the adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology 
beyond the mandated HAA operations?  
Delimitations 
The study did not attempt to address the ROI on CFIT-avoidance technology 
adoption in different regions of the globe.  Rather, it focused on general aviation 
helicopter operation accidents within the United States.  The historical accident data 
reports prepared by the NTSB and FAA for helicopter CFIT events were used to 
determine the probability of future CFIT accidents occurring, the costs associated with 
such accidents, and costs likely to be incurred when adopting the technology to avoid 
future accidents.  The accident reports were retrieved from the NTSB Aviation Accident 
Database.  For the ROI analysis, all commercial helicopter operations were considered.  
The period of interest for the data was from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 
2015.  The accident reports considered had a finalized status identifying the probable 
cause and safety recommendations, where applicable.  
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While five technologies were identified for mitigation of CFIT accidents, only the 
EGPWS/TAWS, laser radar obstacle and terrain avoidance system, digital map, and radar 
altimeter were considered for adoption.  This purposefully limited technology adoption to 
those technologies that would be installed on the aircraft where an operator would incur 
the cost.  The cost of installing equipment such as the passive tower-based Obstacle 
Collision Avoidance System would be incurred by the government, as it is not installed 
onboard the aircraft. 
Limitations and Assumptions 
This research focused on the potential ROI to be achieved on the adoption of 
CFIT-avoidance technology.  It considered the safety costs associated with a CFIT 
accident and the probability of occurrence based on the accidents that occurred during the 
period of interest.  When performing an ROI analysis or a CBA, costs associated with the 
aircraft accidents to be considered depend on whether they are social or private costs.  
The cost categories considered included those identified under the Aviation Safety 
Targets for Effective Regulation (ASTER) project conducted by the National Aerospace 
Laboratory NLR (2001) for the European Commission.  For the ROI analysis, the 
accident cost categories were limited to those directly related to the accident outcomes; 
for example, loss of aircraft use, loss of resale value, and loss of revenue are private 
costs.  Costs such as site contamination and clearance, loss of baggage, and airport 
closure were not considered, as they are considered public costs.  It must be noted that the 
ASTER cost categories were reflective of those of an airline aircraft accident and were 
scaled to that of accidents in rotorcraft operations by adopting the appropriate values for 
each category of costs.  The accident costs considered for this study were those incurred 
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in an accident that is operational (intended flight) and primarily were a result of the 
aircraft coming into contact with an obstacle or terrain while the pilot still had control.  
Ideally the aircraft should not have been experiencing other anomalies such as engine or 
structural failure.  
The aircraft accident reports may not explicitly state in the safety 
recommendations that the installation of the CFIT-avoidance equipment could have 
prevented the accident.  Therefore, for this specific study it was assumed that the 
installation of the equipment on all the identified accident helicopters would have more 
than likely helped to prevent the eventual accident.  The accident reports included in the 
analysis were factual reports, that is, the accident investigation had been completed. 
The costs associated with a helicopter accident or the adoption of the different 
CFIT-avoidance technology will vary by the source and category.  A detailed analysis of 
each category was performed.  As the technology already exists, it was assumed that all 
costs associated with the research, development, and production of the pieces of 
equipment were already factored into the retail price.  The method used to extract the cost 
data from the different data sources such as websites, catalogs, quotes, and databases of 
the various vendors, original equipment manufacturers, customer service facilities, and 
operators depended on how the data are stored.  These sources can vary over time, and 
therefore, the data were limited to the time they were extracted with no consideration 
given to future updates.  It was also assumed that the method used to estimate the ROI 
would be flexible enough to allow iterative estimates to be made for future analysis.  
An additional assumption was that the safety initiatives implemented by the 
organization, for example the SMS, would not be the leading factor for the reduction in 
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the CFIT accident rate. Though these safety initiatives can be considered confounding 
variables, the definition of a CFIT accident suggests that without the information 
presented by the CFIT-avoidance equipment, the pilot while still in control of the aircraft, 
is unlikely to be aware of the impending collision.  It was also assumed that the reduction 
on the accident rate would largely be achieved by the industry adopting the available 
CFIT technology.  
 
Definitions of Terms 
Accident An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that 
takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft 
with the intention of flight and all such persons have 
disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious 
injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage 
(CFR Title 49 830.2). 
Accident costs Also referred to as aircraft safety costs are the costs an 
operator is likely to experience as the direct or indirect 
consequences of an accident.  Direct costs are those primarily 
related to the aircraft airframe and occupants and include: 
deaths, injuries, aircraft physical damage, loss of resale value, 
aircraft loss of use, and loss of baggage.  Indirect costs are 
those costs related to other consequences of the accident 
including: search and rescue costs, costs of airline immediate 
response, costs of accident investigation, loss of investment 
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income, increased costs of insurance, and costs of loss of 
reputation (Cavka & Cokorilo, 2012). 
Accident outcomes These are the observable and measurable effects or 
consequences of an accident.  These outcomes include severity 
of injuries or number of deaths of crew and passengers, 
severity of aircraft damage, extent of damage to environment 
and infrastructure, and injury or death to civilians on ground. 
CFIT  An accident that occurs when an airworthy aircraft is flown 
under the control of a qualified pilot, into terrain, water 
surface, or obstacles, with inadequate awareness on the part of 
the pilot of the impending collision (FAA, 2003).  These 
accidents to some extent can be attributed to the pilot’s lack of 
awareness of the aircraft’s altitude relative to proximate terrain 
and obstacles and usually occur when the pilot cannot visually 
ascertain terrain / obstacles in prevailing flight conditions 
(FAA,2007). 
CFIT-avoidance Technology   
  Refers to a component or system that, when installed in 
aircraft, has the potential to mitigate the occurrence of a CFIT 
accident (including water and obstacles).  For the purposes of 
this study, wire strikes were included relative to the equipment 
configuration under consideration. 
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Industry For the purpose of this study, the industry was considered as 
the rotorcraft manufacturers and operators.  Rotorcraft 
manufacturers perform development test, training, sales 
demonstration, post-maintenance, and production (ferry) flights 
and are exposed to the same risk of incurring a CFIT. 
ROI  The monetary benefit to the investor resulting from an investment 
in the development, change, or management of a product or 
system.  In safety, the ROI is a means of measuring the benefit of 
investing financial resources to the improvement of safety. 
 
List of Acronyms 
AHS America Helicopter Society 
AIS Abbreviated Injury Scale 
ASTER Aviation Safety Targets for Effective Regulation 
CASR Center for Aviation Research 
CBA Cost-benefit analysis 
CFIT  Controlled Flight into Terrain 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
DALY Disability Adjusted Life Year 
DMC Direct Maintenance Cost 
DOC Direct Operating Cost 
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System 
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EHEST European Helicopter Safety Team 
EHSAT European Helicopter Safety Analysis Team 
EMS Emergency Medical Services 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAMS Federal Air Marshal Service 
FCW Forward Collision Warning 
FFDO Federal Flight Deck Officer 
FH Flight Hours 
GA General Aviation 
GAJSC General Aviation Joint Steering Committee 
GAMA General Aviation Manufacturers Association  
GPS Global Positioning System 
HAA Helicopter Air Ambulance 
HAI Helicopter Association International 
HC Human Capital 
HEMS Helicopter Emergency Medical Services 
HLY Healthy Life Years 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
IHST International Helicopter Safety Team 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
IPSB Installed Physical Secondary Barrier 
IQR Interquartile Range 
MFD Multi-function Display 
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MRM Maintenance Resource Management 
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures 
NLR National Aerospace Laboratory 
NTSB National Transport Safety Board 
OBSS Onboard Safety Systems 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PHM Prognostic and Health Management 
QALY Quality Adjusted Life Years 
ROHSEI Return on Health, Safety, and Environment Investments 
ROI Return on Investment 
SAR Search and Rescue 
SMS Safety Management System 
SPS Standard Problem Statement 
SRM Safety Risk Management 
TABC Time-Driven Activity-Based Costing 
TAWS Terrain Awareness Warning System 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
VOLY Value of Statistical Life Year 
VOSL Value of Statistical Life 
WTP Willingness to Pay 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
This literature review provides an overview of the ROI analyses or cost-benefit 
assessments as applied within the aviation industry of the costs associated with aviation 
accidents, benefits associated with safety improvements, and a summary of CFIT-
avoidance technology.  Though the purpose of this study is to estimate the ROI that can 
be achieved from broadly adopting the CFIT-avoidance technology, it is useful to 
understand how costs and benefits have been identified when CBAs have been performed 
with respect to the aviation industry.  As previously described, a ROI is considered as the 
ratio of gain to investment and measure of the “return”, cost savings, profit, or cost 
avoidance that results from a given use of money (Feldman et al., 2009), and therefore 
understanding the costs is important.  For the broader adoption of any given technology, 
the ROI can be assessed at the industry level, and, in this case, the industry will be 
defined as an entity comprising of rotorcraft manufacturers and operators. 
As helicopter operations have progressively become more complex and 
challenging, manufacturers and operators have continued to take advantage of 
technological improvements to provide pilots the operational flexibility they need.  The 
introduction of new and advanced computerized aircraft systems has increased safety 
levels by reducing pilots’ workload and increasing operational capabilities (Tsang & 
Vidulich, 2004).  
A continuing challenge for the aviation industry and others is the ability to adopt 
new technology in a cost effective and timely manner.  This challenge is a result of 
operators trying to achieve a safety and economic equilibrium that is dictated by the 
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productivity and profitability limits set within contemporary transport analyses.  It is 
therefore necessary to develop a method of assessing the costs of safety in the event of an 
accident, and the benefits that may be realized on making the necessary investments in 
safety improvements (Cavka & Cokorilo, 2012).  
In today’s competitive environment experienced at a global level, all businesses 
have to demonstrate their profitability and value to shareholders by decreasing their 
overhead costs and operating expenses (Jervis & Collins, 2001).  The various segments of 
these businesses are expected to demonstrate their value to the organization as the 
business continues to evolve in a fast-paced environment.  One of the value propositions 
is that a competitive advantage may be created by an organization through investments 
for improved product, health, and environmental safety.  Safety managers therefore need 
a decision tool to help them determine which elements of a safety program will offer the 
best ROI (Jervis & Collins, 2001).  For rotorcraft manufacturers, these elements of a 
safety program include safety technology developed and integrated into its fleet as well 
as their customers’ fleet to mitigate a specific safety hazard or improve aircraft operations 
for pilot and crew.  With rotorcraft manufacturers also being operators, they are likely to 
incur the same costs as their customers if they lost an aircraft in an accident during flight 
test, production, or training activities.  By investing in new safety technologies for their 
fleet, they experience the same benefits.  
 The continued growth of aviation activity around the world comes with a risk of 
an increase in the number of incidents and accidents currently being experienced.  This 
possibility highlights the need to develop and adopt safety technology in a proactive 
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manner.  The adoption of new safety technology requires a thoughtful process for its 
introduction into the market since its adoption will depend on:  
1) How easy it is to integrate into existing aircraft systems and its performance; 
2) If it meets the customers’ needs;  
3) The existing socio-economic conditions; and, 
4) The opinion of leaders and stakeholders (Tang, 2006). 
Adopting any new safety technology requires the investment of resources in 
aircraft equipment.  Understanding the value proposition for such pieces of equipment to 
each stakeholder group is important.  For one customer group, the adoption of the 
equipment may be a high value proposition, while for another it’s a losing one (Marais & 
Weigel, 2006).  Cost issues can influence the commitment of resources for safety efforts 
in complex environments.  In aviation and medical practice where the teams highly 
interact with technology, safety is paramount (Helmerich, 2000).  In order to propose the 
broader adoption of safety technology, one needs to understand the costs involved, the 
issues that may arise, and to perform a cost benefit analyses or ROI analysis.  This can be 
done at an industry or organizational level. 
Return on Investment 
 The goal of performing an ROI analysis is to evaluate the impact an investment 
has on owners of an organization or industry.  Impact can be assessed in terms of the 
benefits and costs resulting from the investment as observed from the perspective of the 
investor or individual performing the analysis.  The versatility and simplicity of the ROI 
metric makes it a useful tool for developing a company’s business case and increasing the 
management and investors’ confidence (Westerlind, 2004).  Returns or benefits can be in 
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three forms: economic, socio-economic, and social.  Economic returns are the financial 
returns created by the investment; socio-economic returns are savings the state or society 
realizes, while social returns are the less tangible effects such as an increased sense of 
self-esteem and personal independence (Krlev, Munscher, & Mulbert, 2013).  For the 
adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology, the tangible costs and benefits can be 
evaluated from the industry’s perspective, and a review of past research can facilitate the 
identification of those that are applicable.  
A review of current research showed that safety ROI research has been focused 
more on the operations aspect than the aircraft equipment and technology one.  CBAs 
that account for societal or public costs and benefits have been used to determine whether 
technology and aircraft equipment changes being mandated for safety improvements 
would not have a negative financial impact.  The most prominent research on safety ROI 
resulted in the development of the ORC Network Occupational Safety and Health Group 
software named ORC Return on Health, Safety, and Environment Investments 
(ROHSEI).  This software has been widely used by companies, government agencies, and 
educational institutions to evaluate and communicate the business value of HSE 
investments specific in projects and the overall business (Linhard, 2005).   
The ROHSEI process considers both direct and hidden impacts on business 
performance.  Direct impacts are those easily identified and quantifiable impacts that 
include capital, production downtime, and personnel time.  These impacts are assessed 
using various cost parameters such as: property damage, production downtime, design 
and engineering time, and operational personnel time, among others.  Hidden impacts are 
those that affect business performance and include: worker productivity, product quality, 
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and customer satisfaction.  They are more difficult to identify and quantify as they are 
associated with the project in question and require feedback to the analysis team from the 
individuals involved (Linhard, 2005). 
Johnson and Avers (2012) described a process for predicting and / or measuring 
the safety and financial ROI for human factors safety interventions.  Using the ROI 
calculator developed by the FAA and Booze, Allen, Hamilton Consulting, the researchers 
demonstrated how an individual with technical expertise to identify the benefits and 
investments associated with the safety intervention can evaluate the ROI.  With the 
accident and incident data available from a large maintenance organization where fatigue 
was found to be a contributory factor, the researchers calculated the ROI.  The company 
identified the costs involved in delivering fatigue training to employees and estimated the 
expected benefits from a reduction in equipment damage and injuries.  An ROI of 312% 
over six quarters was calculated using the calculator’s basic formula: 
ROI = [(Net Returns or Benefits) – Investment (Cost)] / [Investment (Cost)] 
where: Net Returns or Benefits = Estimated Return (Benefits) * Probability of Success 
 The Center for Aviation Research (CASR) performed a study to illustrate the 
business benefits of a Safety Management System (SMS) by developing an analytical 
framework through which the various types of costs associated with the SMS are 
accounted for (Lercel et al., 2011).  Using the macro-to-micro analytical framework, the 
business benefits of safety programs were evaluated.  At the macro-level, an analysis of 
the stock value of an airline after a major accident showed that the value of the airline 
could depreciate by as much as 25% and take over a year to recover.  At the mid-level, 
the analysis showed that financial benefits of safety programs can only be realized when 
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a program is sufficiently targeted toward a specific behavioral change.  At the micro-
level, the researchers used examples to illustrate how the costs and safety benefits of a 
particular safety invention can be tracked, and the desired return is not always achieved 
within the first year but over a period that is dependent on different factors.  The safety 
investment model presented in their research portrayed the SMS as a combination of 
multiple safety initiatives with varying rates of return, risk, and period of return (Lercel et 
al., 2011).  When applied broadly, these SMS initiatives can include the adoption of 
safety technology.  
Stewart and Mueller (2013) performed a cost-benefit analysis of aviation security 
measures employed to prevent attacks on airports and their associated facilities to 
determine the optimal security measures.  The three measures evaluated were the Federal 
Air Marshal Service (FAMS), the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) Program, and the 
installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB).  Consideration was given to the threat 
likelihood, costs of security measure, hazard likelihood, risk reduction, and expected 
losses.  The cost-effectiveness of the measures was compared using three criteria: (1) net 
present value, (2) benefit-to-cost ratio, and (3) break even analysis, to assess where the 
risk probability becomes too high for the measure to be cost effective.  The researchers 
found that the IPSBs and FFDO programs were cost effective if the annual attack 
probability exceeded 0.5% and 2% respectively.  A reduction in the FAMS budget was 
also found to be a viable policy alternative.  These results provide a basis for making the 
right risk management decisions for these security measures. 
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Stewart and Muller (2014) further performed a cost-benefit analysis of measures 
designed to provide enhanced protection for airport terminals and their associated 
facilities.  In this study, four significant threat scenarios were considered:  
1) a large truck bomb,  
2) a curbside car bomb,  
3) a luggage or vest bomb, and  
4) a public grounds shooting attack.  
The protective measures included: 
1) the addition of permanent vehicle search points,  
2) check-in and screening personnel,  
3) curbside blast deflection and shatterproof glass,  
4) training airport police rapid response team to special weapons and tactics 
standards,  
5) directing vehicles to remote lots,  
6) eliminating lanes closest to the terminal,  
7) adding support columns for upper level roadways,  
8) searching all luggage entering terminals, and  
9) adding 30 handheld bomb sniffers and bomb sniffing dogs.  
To evaluate the costs-effectiveness of these measures, the researchers applied risk-based 
decision theory with the same three criteria in their previous research as described earlier 
plus Monte-Carlo simulation methods to propagate the hazard likelihood.  The 
researchers found that the attack probabilities would have to be much higher than the 
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levels observed at that time to justify the additional protective measures and the 
investment of financial resources. 
One of the most critical functions of original equipment manufacturers and 
operators is to ensure their assets such as combat vehicles and aircraft are available for 
operations when needed.  To achieve a high operational availability, the operation, 
maintenance, and logistic support of the assets should be effectively managed.  The 
utilization of Prognostic and Health Management (PHM) technology allows the operators 
to acquire detailed health information to facilitate the achievement of the set operational 
availability goals (Banks et al., 2009).  A cost-benefit analysis was found to be useful in 
supporting the estimation of the expected ROI for a customer who is considering 
adopting PHM technology.  The research showed the relationship between a CBA and 
ROI when the ROI was to be used as a decision metric.  Banks et al. (2009) provided a 
general methodology for conducting the cost-benefit analysis with the following 
considerations:  
 the scope of the PHM system,  
 the upfront or acquisition and installation costs,  
 the life-cycle costs (spares and maintenance),  
 projected usage profile of the platform, and 
 planned depot overhauls and scheduled maintenance overhauls.  
An estimated payback period for the PHM technology and its impact over the asset’s 
lifecycle was also determined.  The ROI calculation was based on the formula: 
ROI = (Benefit Gain-Technology Cost) / Technology Cost 
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Jervis and Collins (2001) applied the Analytical Hierarchy process as a tool for 
determining which safety program elements offer the best ROI.  The authors considered 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Voluntary Protection 
Programs as the model safety program for which the process can be applied due to their 
comprehensive safety management approach.  The research focused on six managerial 
safety program elements:  
a) management leadership and employee involvement,  
b) worksite analysis,  
c) hazard prevention and control,  
d) safety and health training,  
e) documentation review, and  
f) occurrence of bargaining agent.  
The results showed that the hazard “prevention and control” and “management leadership 
and employee involvement” elements provided the highest benefit-to-cost ratio.  These 
are generally considered the basic requirements for a successful safety program. 
 ROI analyses or cost-benefit analyses for safety systems have been performed in 
other industries.  In the road transport industry, three onboard safety systems (OBSS): 
lane departure warning (LDW), roll stability control (RSC), and forward collision 
warning (FCW) for Class 7 and 8 trucks were analyzed for their economic and cost 
benefits (Department of Transport, 2013).  The direct and indirect benefits associated 
with a reduction in crashes from the use of OBSS were compared with the costs of 
deploying each system.  The costs were associated with the technology acquisition, 
installation, maintenance, replacement, and training.  The benefits included the tax 
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deduction savings associated with the OBSS investment, operational, environmental, 
labor compensation, property damage, legal settlement, court costs, medical related costs, 
monetized value of pain and suffering, and lost productivity.  The results showed that the 
estimated benefits of LWD and RSC systems outweighed the estimated costs, while no 
significant difference was observed for the FCW system.  The LWD and RSC systems 
benefits to the carrier outweighed the costs by a factor (benefits-to-costs ratio) of 14.69 to 
4.95 and 12.50 to 4.7 respectively.  The FCW system benefits-to-costs ratio was not 
determined as the benefits were found not to be a statistically significant factor 
(Department of Transport, 2013). 
A review of the existing literature on ROI as detailed above showed that for the 
aviation, in the same manner as other transport sectors, CBAs had been extensively used 
to determine the benefits of adopting safety technology.  In aviation, when the ROI 
methodology has been used, it has been limited to operations.  To address the existing 
gap on performing ROI analysis on rotorcraft safety improvements, this research 
reviewed the different economic models that can be applied with the goal of proposing an 
applicable method of evaluating the safety costs and benefits of broadly adopting the 
CFIT-avoidance technology.  
Performing an ROI evaluation.  In the aviation industry, various economic 
models have been applied to estimate the benefits achieved by implementing safety 
improvements.  To inform and encourage organizations to be early adopters of Safety 
Management Systems, Whealan-George (2013) reviewed the different economic models 
that can be used to estimate the potential benefits.  These models are:  
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1) Accounting Approach: The basic direct accounting approach applied by Friend 
(2011) and Skydel (2011) estimates the total business costs with and without 
safety interventions based on historical data and probability of occurrence.  This 
direct approach does not take into account how an industry’s business operation 
constantly changes over time, thereby skewing the estimated savings.  
2) Time-Driven Activity-Based Costing (TABC): a proprietary financial 
methodology developed by John Cox of Safety Operating Systems and Triant 
Flouris to estimate an airline’s safety costs.  The TABC captures costs associated 
with any organizational activity that has an impact on safety (Rosenkrans, 2011).  
The organization can identify the variable and fixed costs that safety officers can 
adjust to simulate their business and predict their cost saving on safety initiatives.  
3) FAAs Return on Investment simulator: An FAA accounting worksheet and 
PowerPoint training course used for estimating the benefits of expended costs on 
safety initiatives and the probability of the identified safety events occurring.  The 
output from the ROI simulator facilitate the conversations between safety and 
financial specialists on the expected ROI over a period of six quarters by 
presenting the pre- and post-safety intervention values (Rosenkrans, 2011).  The 
outputs consist of these five graphs: (1) investments and returns over time; (2) 
investment profile; (3) financial return profile; (4) probability of success; and (5) 
total safety events over time.  The FAA accounting worksheet utilizes the 
formula:  
ROI = {[(estimated return or benefits * probability of success as a percentage) – 
(investment costs)]/ (investment costs)}      
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4) Cost-benefit analysis using historical data: This model was applied by the FAA 
when it determined that Part 121 operators could benefit from implementing a 
SMS for their organizations.  The FAA determined the economic value by 
assuming a 50% reduction on the losses from the 172 accidents that could have 
been wholly or partially prevented by the adoption of an SMS due to its 
formalized and intensive nature of addressing safety issues (Whealan-George, 
2013). 
5) Cost-optimization algorithms combined with probable-risk: A simulation with 
budget constraints and failure probabilities allows an organization to determine 
which events or precursors to events can be addressed in order to achieve greater 
cost savings.  Addressing lower level events reduces the probability of the costly 
high level critical failure occurring (Whealan-George, 2013). 
6) Analytical Hierarchical Process: Though not fully an economic model, the 
process breaks down complex processes into sub-processes and assigns them 
numerical values representing their weighting, priority, and significance levels.  
This approach in a safety improvement environment requires an individual, based 
on their experience and knowledge, to detail the elements of the safety 
improvement and prioritize them by their perceived benefit of its application.  The 
intangible (indirect) benefits can be difficult to quantify, and the process can 
become time consuming (Jervis & Collins, 2001; Whealan-George, 2013). 
7) Simulation model using system dynamics and data mining: This model employs a 
system dynamics approach incorporating human decision making and system drift 
over a period of time leading to an accident.  Charles-Owaba and Adebiyi (2006) 
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employed the model for a pre- and post-safety program evaluation of a 
manufacturing organization.  
8) Baldrige Performance of Excellence Model: This model is used to estimate the net 
social value of improved quality performance.  It would therefore require the 
social value of the benefits of safety improvements to be defined beyond the basic 
financial terms.  
9) Contrarian view of safety at any costs and modeling benefits: This economic view 
suggests that the safety has already reached a long term economic equilibrium 
despite the various methods of measuring benefits (Vasign, Fleming, & Tacker, 
2008).  They were in the opinion that economic models may not necessarily be 
the best method of evaluating the economic benefits of an SMS as the intangibles 
such as passenger reaction, labor reaction, liability risks, and government 
enforcement are difficult to measure. 
The economic models described above provide different approaches to estimating the 
ROI or cost-benefits associated with the safety interventions under consideration.  The 
safety specialist has to decide which model to utilize depending on its applicability, its 
complexity, the available resources, scope of the study, and the costs and benefits under 
consideration.  Understanding the costs and benefits associated with the adoption of 
CFIT-avoidance technology will be critical to performing a more representative ROI.  
Benefits and costs the rotorcraft industry may experience include the avoidance of future 
accident safety costs and reduction in insurance costs, as discussed herein.  
 
 
35 
 
 
Accident Safety Costs 
 Reducing the losses experienced by an organization or industry is the first goal of 
introducing safety technology.  These losses can be measured in terms of costs of lives, 
time, material, and equipment, depending on the type of industry.  Huang, Leamon, 
Courtney, DeArmond, Chen, and Blair (2009) designed a study to explore the perceptions 
of corporate financial decision makers on the impact of safety on a company’s financial 
performance.  The researchers estimated that for every dollar spent on direct costs 
associated with occupational injuries, $2.12 was spent on indirect costs, while the return 
on every dollar invested on safety was $4.41 based on the 5,840 fatal and 4.1 million 
non-fatal occupational injuries that were reported in 2006 in the U.S. private industry.  
This ROI suggests that a company should consider investing the right amount of financial 
resources to address the most critical safety concerns for its industry.  This also requires a 
good understanding of the costs which are to be incurred or avoided for each initiative. 
 The responsibility of providing evidence to an organization’s management 
showing how investing in safety can be worthwhile and how it can be accomplished lies 
with the safety professional (Friend, 2011).  The safety professional should therefore 
provide quality information to assist management in making decisions.  This information 
not only includes the costs, but also the intangible elements such as the enhancement or 
loss of reputation, positive versus adverse publicity, and goodwill from the public and 
employees.  In providing the ROI information to management, the safety practitioner 
must consider the losses that may occur, the risk (exposure to the losses), and costs 
associated with those losses that occur (Friend, 2011). 
36 
 
 
 In aviation, past aircraft safety cost-benefit analyses have identified two cost 
categories: direct and indirect costs (Čavka & Čokorilo, 2012; Čokorilo, Gvozdenović, 
Vasov, & Mirosavljević, 2010).  These cost-benefit evaluations were based on the cost 
implications defined by the National Aerospace Laboratory (2001) as shown in Table 1.  
The costs of these accidents were determined primarily on the aircraft type and level of 
damage.  In these two studies, the A320-200 and A380 aircrafts were considered, and the 
same cost categories can be scaled down to reflect costs of a helicopter accident. 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Accident Safety Costs 
 
Direct Cost Category Cost Description 
Aircraft physical damage Minor (15% damage) 
Moderate (50% damage) 
Major (80% damage) 
Disaster (100% damage) 
Catastrophic (100% damage) 
Possible loss of resale value 5-10% of aircraft market value (for partial losses) 
Aircraft loss of use Monthly lease cost x assumed months to replace 
Aircraft loss of investment 
return 
Part of aircraft loss of use 
Site contamination and 
clearance 
Wide body: 1.2-2.8 M€ 
Narrow body: 0. 7-1.3 M€ 
Smaller aircraft: 0.13-0.2 M€ 
Airline costs for delay Wide body: 22 € x number of passengers on flight 
Narrow body: 20 € x number of passengers on 
flight 
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Airport closure Airport disruption depends on severity of the 
accident. Only applicable if accident occurs on or 
close to the runway. 
 
Deaths and injuries Value of a Statistical Life (VOSL): 1-2.64 M€ 
VOSL differs per country. Value of injury is 13% 
of VOSL. 
Loss of staff investment Replacement cost per pilot: 45000 € 
Loss of baggage Underfloor cargo carried on passenger flights: 
110000 € 
Personal baggage on passenger flights: 45000 € 
  
Indirect Cost Category Cost Description 
Search and Rescue (SAR) 
costs 
Average SAR costs: 0.6 M€ 
Airline immediate response Average costs per accident: 0.5-3 M€ 
Cost of accident investigation State: 0.1-100 M€ 
Airline: 1 M€ 
Manufacturer: 1 M€ 
Third party damage Third party death and injury: use similar VOSL as 
in passenger death and injury + third party physical 
damage 
Loss of investment income These costs are reflected in insurance premiums. 
Increased cost of insurance Loss of 20% insurance discount for airline involved 
Loss of reputation Airline loss of turnover: 0-380 M€ (Huge range. 
Loss to society is far less than to airline, since 
major part of reduced demand will shift to other 
airline.) 
Manufacturer (Likely that airlines will buy aircraft 
from other manufacturers.) 
Note.  Adapted from “Aviation Safety Targets for Effective Regulation, a Consolidated 
Report,” by National Aerospace Laboratory, NLR, 2001.  
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According to the NLR (2001), the most significant determinants of costs arising 
from aircraft accidents are aircraft damage, death and injury of occupants, and loss of 
reputation of an airline (operator).  The magnitude of these direct and indirect costs is 
directly linked to the severity of an accident where severity is determined by the level of 
damage and number of deaths or injuries to the occupants.  In the NLR analysis, the 
accident severity scheme shown in Table 2 was used to model the effects of accident 
severity on the level of cost.  From this analysis, it’s expected that in a catastrophic 
accident, an aircraft will be completely damaged and at least 80% of the occupants will 
perish.  CFIT accidents are more generally considered to have a catastrophic outcome due 
to the nature of the events. 
 
 
Table 2  
 
Accident Classification Severity Scheme 
 
Level Damage [%] Death [%] 
Catastrophic 100 80 
Disaster 100 30 
Major 80 0 
Moderate 50 0 
Minor 15 0 
Note.  Adapted from “Aviation Safety Targets for Effective Regulation, a Consolidated 
Report,” by National Aerospace Laboratory, NLR, 2001.  
 
 
 
Aircraft physical damage.  The actual costs arising from the damage of an 
aircraft can vary greatly depending on the age of an aircraft, extent of damage, and 
financial inflation.  To determine the average loss of aircraft value with age, actual cost 
figures for individual aircraft were collected.  The costs were normalized to obtain an 
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“index” for the relative degree of damage expressed as a percentage of the aircraft total 
damage as shown previously in Table 2 (NLR, 2001).  The cost value for the aircraft 
physical damage can be determined by multiplying the aircraft’s market value and the 
corresponding damage ratio (Čavka & Čokorilo, 2012).  For rotorcrafts, the market value 
(residual value) at any given period can be found in the Helivalue$, Inc. Helicopter Blue 
Book. 
Possible loss of resale value.  Loss in resale value of an aircraft involved in an 
accident amounts to approximately 5-10% of its market value.  The losses are determined 
by the degree of severity of the accident from minor, moderate, major, and disaster to 
catastrophic.  The disaster and catastrophic severities bear a complete loss of resale value 
(NLR, 2001).  In their research, Čavka & Čokorilo (2012) assumed a possible loss of 
resale value of 5% for the minor, moderate, and major categories.  A helicopter’s market 
value can be determined from the Helicopter Blue Book. 
Aircraft loss of use.  These are costs incurred when the accident aircraft is not 
available for flight operations and necessitates the leasing or purchase of a replacement 
aircraft.  The monthly leasing costs are expressed as a percentage of the average market 
value and the estimated number of months the lease would last or before a new 
replacement aircraft is introduced.  This period was determined to be usually between six 
to twelve months for the airline jets (Čavka & Čokorilo, 2012).  Consideration should be 
given to this cost category if a rotorcraft operator plans to use a leased aircraft until the 
repair of the accident aircraft is complete or one obtains a new aircraft. 
Occupants’ deaths and injuries.  The injury and death of crew and passengers in 
an aircraft accident is an unfortunate outcome, and determining the value of a life that is 
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lost or the quality of life that will be lived is considered to be a difficult and undesirable 
task.  Even with this difficulty, the industry has made attempts to determine the value on 
which to compensate families for the loss of or injury to their loved ones.  Monetizing 
these health impacts is a means of comparing benefits of a reduction in risk against the 
costs and helps facilitate quicker and more consistent decision making.  To this end, 
different methods as highlighted by the European Commission (2009) have been used to 
determine these values.  They include: 
a) Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY): This method uses available information on 
improvements in health / life quality combined with the duration of that 
improvement for its values.  A year of life in perfect health is counted as 1.0, and 
the value decreases for years of less than perfect health based on a value that 
represents an average among different social groups.  A common discount factor 
is used to discount future life years. 
b) Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY): This is the negative value of the QALY.  
It measures the number of quality adjusted years that are lost in comparison to the 
benchmarking scenario.  For aviation accidents, the resulting disabilities would be 
compared to similar outcomes for other accidents.  DALY and QALY should lead 
to comparable values if performed correctly (European Commission, 2009). 
c) Healthy Life Years (HLY): This approach measures the number of quality 
adjusted remaining life years per person and with future years discounted and 
weighted across individuals.  When using the remaining life expectancy as the 
upper bound for summation, the HLY value should be comparable to the QALY 
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value, as HLY is essentially a summation of the QALYs (European Commission, 
2009). 
d) Cost of Illness: A measure comprised of only the medical expenses related to the 
incidence of an illness, and the lower the rate of occurrence, the saved expenses 
constitute a benefit.  If the risk option results in a higher occurrence of the illness, 
the expenses are considered direct costs.  This measure is limited as it does not 
account for the indirect costs to society such as loss of labor hours (European 
Commission, 2009). 
e) Human Capital (HC): As a measure of the loss of social welfare, this method 
attempts to measure the loss of future earnings as a result of disability or 
premature death.  The potential shortfall of this method is the different values 
given to lives based solely on projected future earnings, the likely exclusion of 
individuals outside of the workforce by assigning a value equal to zero, and the 
individual’s preferences for safety not being reflected.  Adopting average 
monetary values for individuals outside the workforce can ease these concerns 
(Andersson & Treich, 2011).  
f) VOSL: defined as the monetary value of an improvement in safety to achieve a 
risk reduction that would prevent one statistical death or injury.  It is derived from 
an individual’s Willingness to Pay (WTP) for reduced risk and the reduction 
(European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2015).  VOSL, as an 
economic measure commonly used by governments, is also considered not to 
adequately represent the value of a life but the risk, as it is derived from market 
decisions.  Basing the VOSL on perceived risk can introduce bias as the level of 
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risk may vary with the perceptions of each individual (Viscusi, 2005).  Estimating 
the VOSL is considered challenging due to the limitations in identifying the 
worker and job characteristics that may be correlated with the job and how the 
workplace risks are to be measured (Lee, 2012).  A method commonly used to 
quantify an individual’s perception of the utility of safety improvements when 
facing fatality risks is the maximum utility theory, and the determined value is 
referred to as the subjective value of statistical life (Andersson, 2007; Yang, Liu, 
& Xu, 2016).  The utility of safety improvements results in a reduced fatality rate 
that together with the income of individuals that benefit can be used to determine 
the social value of statistical life.  These safety improvements are assumed to have 
been implemented using collected taxes (Yang, Liu, & Xu, 2016).  The different 
methods of determining VOSL create challenges, and therefore the choice of 
VOSL will be dependent of the type of study being performed. 
g) Value of Statistical Life Year (VOLY): Generally, VOLY is a measure of the 
WTP for an increase of one additional year of life expectancy, and, like the 
VOSL, does not measure the quality of life.  A major concern with the application 
of the VOLY, just like VOSL, is how to monetize a life without appearing to be 
unethical when every individual’s life is considered priceless.  The two measures 
should reflect a change in risk or safety levels (European Commission, 2009). 
h) Value of Statistical Injury: defined as the monetary value of an improvement in 
safety to achieve injury risk reduction that would prevent one statistical injury 
(Andersson & Treich, 2011).  These values of improvement are represented as a 
percentage of VOSL depending on the severity of the injury as categorized on the 
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Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS).  The injuries are classified into six categories 
ranging from AIS Code 1 for minor injuries to AIS Code 6 for fatal injuries.  The 
valuation of each injury level is related to the loss of quality and quantity of life 
resulting from an injury typical of that level and as a fraction of a fatality 
(EUROCONTROL, 2015; FAA, 2016). 
The availability of different measures for the monetized value of a life lost or injury 
incurred in an accident provides options for an economic analysis.  Each measure has its 
limitations, but cost-benefit models have increasingly used the VOSL, a value that 
includes an element of indemnity together with a society’s WTP to avoid a statistical 
fatality (NLR, 2001).  For aviation related economic analysis, the FAA and 
EUROCONTROL have adopted the VOSL measure. 
Scuffham, Chalmers, O’Hare, and Wilson (2002) estimated and compared the 
direct and indirect costs of general aviation accidents.  Consideration was given to 
medical treatment, damage to aircraft and property, and accident investigation costs for 
direct costs and HC and WTP approaches for indirect costs.  The HC approach 
considered the value of lost production from employed work and household activity.  For 
the WTP approach, the Land Transport Safety Authority’s estimated values of a society’s 
willingness to pay to avoid a fatality or injury were considered.  The direct and indirect 
costs associated with aircraft accidents shown in Table 1 together with those related to 
the integration of the technology can be appropriately modified and employed in 
estimating the ROI likely to be achieved on the adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology 
from an operator and manufacturer perspective.  Due to the limited information available 
on the earnings or injuries for the crew and passengers lost or injured in rotorcraft 
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accidents, the ROI analysis will adopt the recommended VOSL and VSI values 
recommended by the U.S. Department of Transport (2015).  The U.S. Department of 
Transport has determined that the recommended VOSL for its analyses in 2015, based on 
existing data, should be $9.4 million.  With the WTP being difficult to estimate for an 
entire range of disabilities that could be incurred in a transport accident, the Department 
has rated injuries in terms of severity and duration on a scale of QALYs as compared to 
the alternative of perfect health.  The scores were grouped according to the AIS to yield 
coefficients that can be applied to the VOSL to assign each injury class a value 
corresponding to a fraction of a fatality, as shown in Table 3.  
 
 
Table 3  
 
Relative Disutility Factors by Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) 
 
AIS Level Severity Fraction of VSL 
AIS 1 Minor 0.003 
AIS 2 Moderate 0.047 
AIS 3 Serious 0.105 
AIS 4 Severe 0.266 
AIS 5 Critical 0.593 
AIS 6 Unsurvivable 1.000 
Note.  Adapted from “Guidance on Treatment of the economic Value of Statistical Life 
(VSL) in Department of Transportation Analyses- 2015 Adjustment,” by U.S. 
Department of Transport, 2015.  
 
 
 
To determine the value of any given injury, the applicable fraction of the VSL is 
multiplied by the 2015 VSL value of $9.4 million (U.S. Department of Transport, 2015).  
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CFIT-Avoidance Technology  
 Aircraft manufacturers, component manufacturers, and aircraft operators identify 
new products and technologies for integration into the industry in order to improve 
customer experience and safety.  The integration of some of these technologies is done as 
a result of certification and operation regulation mandates where the main objective is to 
increase the reliability of safety critical systems (Anderson, 2013).  These critical systems 
include those that have integrated the new technologies that target the reduction of 
rotorcraft CFIT accidents.  
According to the FAA (2011), the number of fatal CFIT accidents between 2010 
and 2012 represented a reduction of more than 50% over the preceding three-year period, 
2007 to 2009.  The General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) attributed this 
reduction in fatal accidents to the use of technologies such as global positioning system 
(GPS) with moving maps that provide traffic, terrain, and in-flight weather information.  
The GAJSC, at that time, further suggested that the implementation of new technologies 
such as the angle of attack indicators, ballistic parachutes, and terrain avoidance 
equipment would continue to further reduce the number of general aviation (GA) fatal 
accidents (GAJSC, 2012). 
 The emphasis on the adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology for rotorcraft 
operations can be traced back to the benefits observed for the fixed-wing fleet where the 
worldwide CFIT accident rate fell by 80 percent following the TAWS mandate (IHST, 
2010).  According to the FAA, TAWS has been considered by many in the airplane 
(fixed-wing) safety community as the single most important safety device introduced to 
prevent commercial fatal accidents in 20 years and has been voluntarily adopted in 
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general aviation as part of GPS-based navigation systems (Department of Transportation, 
2012).  The FAA has mandated TAWS for HAA operations, but the anticipated safety 
benefits may extend to other operations in the industry when the technology is adopted 
broadly.  
The U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team (2011) identified the installation 
of proximity detection systems as one of its Intervention Recommendations (IRs) for 
rotorcrafts accidents.  The technology, it opined, would prove to be valuable in 
identifying ground obstructions as helicopters operate regularly in close proximity to 
obstacles.  The CFIT-avoidance technologies recommended by the NLR (2014) are as 
follows: 
a. Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System / (Helicopter) Terrain Awareness 
and Warning System (HTAWS): The HTAWS provides a “look-ahead” function 
to detect terrain or obstacle conflicts by comparing the helicopter flight path to a 
terrain and obstacle database.  The helicopter’s position is based on the 
information provided by an onboard GPS receiver.  Caution alerts (advisory in 
nature) and warning alerts (requiring pilot corrective actions) are generated if 
there are terrain and obstacle conflicts along the helicopter’s flight path 
(Department of Transport, 2012).  HTAWS that integrates data from a wire 
warning database system, for example WireWatch® and WireAware®, can reduce 
the likelihood of collision with transmission mast and power lines (Garmin, 
2016a; Sandel Avionics, 2012).  Examples of existing systems include the 
Honeywell MK XXI and XXII EGPWS, Garmin® HTAWS, and Sandel’s 
ST3400H HeliTAWS®, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
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Figure 1.  Honeywell EGPWS MK XXII.  Retrieved from 
https://parts.seaerospace.com/product_images/35/20324/medium/mkxxii.jpg  
Copyright Southeast Aerospace.  Adapted with permission. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Garmin® HTAWS (010-HTAWS-00).  Retrieved from 
https://buy.garmin.com/en-us/us/p/72799  Copyright GARMIN.  Adapted with 
permission. 
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b. Laser radar obstacle and terrain avoidance system: This system uses an eye-safe 
laser which is mounted on the helicopter’s fuselage to provide information to the 
pilot through both displays and aural warnings on actively detected obstacles such 
as cables, trees, pylons, power lines, or rising terrain in the helicopter’s flight 
path.  The laser radar obstacle warning system comes with a higher probability of 
detection of thin wires, the real-time processing of the measured range image 
data, obstacle classification, and its visualization on the displays (Bers, Schulz, & 
Armbuster, 2005; Stevenson, Verdun, Stern & Koechner, 1994).  Examples of 
existing systems include the Fairchild Control’s HELLAS-A (Awareness) and 
Selex ES LOAM. 
c. Digital map: This system is also referred to as a digital moving map and provides 
clear and precise information on the surrounding operational environment and can 
change or maintain an updated position in correspondence with the aircraft’s 
current position.  The moving map’s information can be sourced from both 
database and sensor technology (Jones, 2002).  The moving map systems are 
either standalone or integrated within the aircraft avionics suite and display the 
map images on a Multi-Function Display (MFD).  The advanced systems can 
provide terrain and obstacle information to the pilot (NLR, 2014).  Examples of 
existing systems include the Flight Management Systems, Israel Aerospace 
Industries, and Moving Terrain-MT Vision Air moving maps, as shown in Figure 
3.  
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Figure 3.  MT VisionAir X Heli: Retrieved from http://www.moving-
terrain.de/lang-en/produkte/mt-visionair-x/mt-visionair-x-heli.html 
Copyright Moving Terrain Air Navigation Systems AG, Germany.  Adapted with 
permission. 
 
 
d. Radar altimeter: The radar altimeter is also referred to as a radio altimeter, and it 
measures the actual altitude of an aircraft with respect to the terrain by measuring 
how long it takes a beam of radio waves to reflect off the ground and return to the 
aircraft.  The radar altimeter can be integrated with other systems to fulfill the 
requirements for advanced applications such as HTAWS and Terrain Collision 
Avoidance System operations (Garmin, 2016b; NLR, 2014).  Examples of 
existing systems include Garmin’s GRATM 55 and 5500 (shown in Figure 4), 
Honeywell AA-300, Freeflight Systems TRA-3000, and TRA-3500 altimeters.  
 
50 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  GRA™ 5500 Radar Altimeter.  Retrieved from 
https://buy.garmin.com/en-US/US/p/135561 Copyright GARMIN.  Adapted with 
permission. 
 
 
 
Summary  
 A review of past literature shows that a gap exists within the body of knowledge for 
the aviation industry on how to estimate the expected ROI when adopting safety 
technology.  The method of estimating an ROI should be predictive rather than a 
retroactive approach, as seen with the OBSS for road transport.  Aviation accident data 
can be used to determine the probability of an accident occurring in the future and by the 
industry to set accident reduction targets to be achieved based on the expected 
performance of the available technology.  This study offered a method of calculating the 
estimated ROI for adopting CFIT technology. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Approach and Design 
A review of the relevant literature supports the researcher’s use of an expanded 
version of the formulas employed by Johnson and Avers (2012) in the ROI calculator for 
human factors safety interventions, ROI = [(Net Returns / Benefits) - Investment (Cost)] / 
(Investment Cost), and by Bank et al. (2009) for calculating the expected ROI for the 
utilization of PHM technology where ROI = [(Benefit Gain - Technology Cost) / 
Technology Cost] to estimate the potential ROI that can be achieved when rotorcraft 
CFIT-avoidance technology is broadly adopted.  In research by the Department of 
Transport (2011), the benefits were considered to be the accident costs avoided with the 
installation of TAWS, and this study considered the same for the rotorcraft industry.  
These costs can be estimated by using the relevant NLR (2001) report cost categories as 
done by Cavka and Čokorilo (2012) and Čokorilo et al. (2010).  Additionally, the 
adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology is considered a SMS risk mitigation measure, 
and costs avoided can be estimated by applying decision analysis as done by Stewart and 
Muller for aviation security (2013) and airport security (2014).  The expanded formula, 
which accounts for the cost savings likely to be realized with a reduction of the CFIT 
accident rate, is represented as Equation 1.  
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where: 
Net Benefits = Accident costs avoided through the adoption of CFIT-
avoidance technology. 
Safety Technology Costs = Costs associated with the integration and usage of 
CFIT-avoidance technology on a rotorcraft. 
 
The purpose of the study was to use historical rotorcraft accident reports and the 
safety costs associated with the accident outcomes to estimate the potential ROI that can 
be achieved if CFIT-avoidance technology is adopted more broadly.  The study:  
(a) identifies the outcomes of each CFIT-related accident (terrain, water, or obstacles 
and wires) occurring between January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2015;  
(b) quantifies the value of the direct and indirect costs associated with each accident;  
(c) determines the CFIT accident rate over the period of study, based on the number 
of CFIT accidents and flight hours accumulated;  
(d) evaluates the CFIT accident rate (probability) with a reduction target range of 
50% to 80%.  The 50% target is based on the reduction observed in fixed-wing 
operations from the three-year period between 2007 to 2009 and the three year 
period between 2010 and 2012 (FAA, 2011).  The 80% target is based on the 
IHST reduction target for the overall rotorcraft accident rate (USJHST, 2010).  
(e) quantifies the costs associated with adopting the CFIT-avoidance technology; and  
(f) employs the appropriate ROI equation in a Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the 
potential ROI that can be achieved if the CFIT accident rate is reduced by the 
50% to 80% levels previously described.   
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This study employed a mixed methods research design performed in two phases.  
In the first phase, a qualitative assessment of the CFIT-related accident reports retrieved 
from the NTSB accident / incident database was performed to identify the accident 
outcomes (injuries, deaths, damage, etc.).  At the beginning of each accident report, 
details of the accident that include: location, date and time, aircraft, aircraft registration, 
regulations under which the flight was conducted, aircraft damage, and injuries were 
provided.  The injuries were categorized by severity to include fatalities.  Within the 
report, the probable cause and findings section was also reviewed to verify that the 
accident was primarily a CFIT.  The qualitative assessment was performed by the 
researcher to identify the accidents to be included in the analysis.  The NTSB reports, 
based on subject matter experts’ analysis, identified the probable cause and findings and 
provided a summary of the factual information with adequate detail for an individual with 
some appreciable aviation experience to determine whether a CFIT occurred and without 
the influence of factors such as mechanical or system failures.  Since no further coding or 
classification of the data for causal factors was required, it was considered that the use of 
additional subject matter expert(s) was not necessary.  The accident data from the 
database, which included information already contained in the accident reports, was also 
extracted into a Microsoft Excel® file for the calculation of the various accident safety 
costs as described in detail herein.  The classification of the rotorcraft by engine type was 
done based on the manufacturer’s designation and using the Aircraft Bluebook from the 
Aviation Week Network as a guide.  
As part of the first phase, flight hours and fleet size data were retrieved from the 
FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Year 2011-2031 and FY 2016-2036 reports (FAA, 
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2017).  The flight hours from the FY 2011-2031 report were used to calculate the 
accident rates for the different rotorcraft categories.  The hours from the FY 2016-2036 
report were used to calculate the number of accidents that are likely to occur if the current 
accident rate remains unchanged and when the targeted reduction of between 50% and 
80% is achieved.  The number of accidents avoided was used to calculate the accident 
costs likely to be avoided for each rotorcraft category.      
In the second phase, data searches and collection were performed to estimate the 
costs associated with the adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology.  Data searches for 
aircraft manufacturer, equipment vendor, and training centers’ catalogs, advertisements, 
quotes, or websites were done.  Costs to install, operate, and maintain the equipment were 
considered.  It was assumed that the equipment, when installed as part of an avionics 
suite, would have the capability to provide the pilot with the information that all four 
CFIT-avoidance technologies recommended in the NLR (2014) report would provide.  
For each piece of equipment, the costs to install, operate, and maintain it were collected.  
These costs were then averaged for each type of  equipment and used for determining the 
technology adoption costs for all the identified CFIT-avoidance equipment.  The cost 
estimates generated in both phases are combined to calculate the ROI with Equation 1.  
The graphical representation of the study’s design is depicted in Figure 4. 
 
55 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Return on investment research process. 
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Accident Safety Costs 
Using the data retrieved for the variables listed in Table 4 and the criteria in Table 
5, the direct and indirect aircraft safety costs associated with the outcomes of the 
accidents for each accident were evaluated.  The cost category criteria applied were 
drawn from the NLR (2001) Aviation Safety Targets for Effective Regulation report 
together with the appropriate assumptions on aircraft accidents and safety costs as applied 
in studies previously described herein and referenced as Rotorcraft Comments in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 4 
Accident Data Variables Utilized in Aircraft Safety Costs Evaluation 
Variable Aircraft Safety Costs  Data Type  
Make Aircraft category Qualitative 
Model  Aircraft category Qualitative 
Engine Type Aircraft category Qualitative 
Number of Engines Aircraft category: turboshaft single or 
piston, turbine single, turbine twin, or heavy 
(based on number of engines and 
manufacturer’s or industry’s classification). 
Quantitative 
Aircraft Damage Aircraft physical damage and loss of resale 
value (destroyed, substantial, or minor)  
Qualitative 
Total Fatal Injuries Deaths and Injuries, Fatal Quantitative 
Total Serious Injuries Deaths and Injuries, Serious Quantitative 
Total Minor Injuries Deaths and Injuries, Minor Quantitative 
Total Uninjured Deaths and Injuries, None Quantitative 
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Table 5 
Aircraft Safety Costs Criteria and Variable Name 
Direct Costs 
Cost Category ASTER Cost Description Rotorcraft Comments Variable 
Aircraft 
physical 
damage 
ASTER Handbook: 
Minor (15% damage) 
Moderate (50% damage) 
Major (80% damage) 
Disaster (100% damage) 
Catastrophic (100% 
damage); 
Percentages based on 
analysis of past accidents 
for larger aircrafts and are 
adopted for estimation 
purposes only. 
For this analysis, the 
ASTER and NTSB 
categories are paired as 
follows:  
 Minor/Moderate: 
Minor 
 Major: Substantial 
 Disaster/Catastrophic: 
Destroyed. 
The costs are based on the 
market value of rotorcraft 
at time off accident.  
CD 
Possible loss of 
resale value 
5-10% of aircraft market 
value (for partial losses) 
Applicable only to aircraft 
with minor damage and 
substantial damage 
(Čavka & Čokorilo, 
2012).  Costs will be 
based on 5% of market 
value of rotorcraft at 
accident date.  
CR 
Aircraft loss of 
use 
Monthly lease cost x 
assumed months to 
replace 
Mid-size single engine 
rotorcraft (e.g. Bell 407) 
monthly lease of $85,000 
(Fadali, Griswold, 
Packham, & Harris, 
2011). 
CL 
Aircraft loss of 
investment 
return 
Part of aircraft loss of use Part of rotorcraft loss of 
use 
N/A 
Site 
contamination 
and clearance 
Wide body: 1.2-2.8 M€ Costs are incurred by the 
local or state emergency 
departments.  Considered 
societal costs and not cost 
to operator. 
N/A 
Narrow body: 0. 7-1.3 M€  
Smaller aircraft: 0.13-0.2 
M€ 
Airline costs 
for delay 
Wide body: 22 € x 
number of passengers on 
flight 
Rotorcraft operations 
differ from airlines as 
majority of flights are 
N/A 
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Narrow body: 20 € x 
number of passengers on 
flight 
non-scheduled and 
therefore delays will be 
considered to incur 
negligible costs.  
Airport closure 
Airport disruption 
depends on severity of the 
accident.  
Only applicable if 
accident occurs on or 
close to the runway. 
Rotorcraft CFIT accidents 
usually do not occur near 
the airport, and therefore 
airport closure costs will 
be considered negligible. 
N/A 
Deaths and 
injuries 
Value of a Statistical Life 
(VOSL): 1-2.64 M€ 
VOSL differs per country.  
Value of injury is 13% of 
VOSL. 
VOSL: $9.4 million.  
Value of injury, refer to 
Table 3 (Department of 
Transport, 2015).  
CF and CI 
Loss of staff 
investment 
Replacement cost per 
pilot: 45000 € 
Replacement costs for a 
rotorcraft pilot are 
difficult to determine.  
With an aircraft pilot 
average pay of $119,360 
(BLS, 2016), the 
replacement costs are 
estimated to be $179,040 
(1.5 times the average 
pay). 
CP 
Loss of 
baggage 
Underfloor cargo carried 
on passenger flights: 
110000 € 
Due to limited baggage 
space on rotorcrafts, these 
costs will be considered 
negligible. 
N/A 
Personal baggage on 
passenger flights: 45000 € 
Indirect Costs  
Cost Category Cost Description Rotorcraft Comments Variable 
Search and 
Rescue (SAR) 
costs 
Average SAR costs: 0.6 
M€ 
According to Čavka & 
Čokorilo (2012), indirect 
safety costs are difficult to 
estimate and predict and 
therefore recommend a 
percentage of the direct 
costs, depending on the 
type of accident and injury 
classification. 
CIN 
Airline 
immediate 
response 
Average costs per 
accident: 0.5-3 M€ 
Cost of 
accident 
investigation 
State: 0.1-100 M€ 
Airline: 1 M€ 
Manufacturer: 1 M€ 
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Third party 
damage 
Third party death and 
injury: use similar VOSL 
as in passenger death and 
injury + third party 
physical damage 
 minor: 5-15% 
(minor); 
 moderate: 25-40%; 
 major: 50-70%;  
 disaster: 85-110%; 
 catastrophic:90-140% 
Due to the variability 
observed in indirect costs 
in previous research, an 
indirect-to-direct cost ratio 
is usually recommended.  
Based on research by 
Manuele (2011) and 
OSHA (2007), a ratio of 
indirect to direct costs of 
1:1 will be applied for this 
study. 
Loss of 
investment 
income 
These costs are reflected 
in insurance premiums 
Increased cost 
of insurance 
Loss of 20% insurance 
discount for airline 
involved 
Loss of 
reputation 
Airline loss of turnover: 0-
380 M€ (Huge range.  
Loss to society is far less 
than to airline, since major 
part of reduced demand 
will shift to other airlines.) 
Manufacturer (Likely that 
airlines will buy aircraft 
from other 
manufacturers.) 
Note.  Adapted from “Aviation Safety Targets for Effective Regulation, a Consolidated 
Report,” National Aerospace Laboratory, NLR, 2001.  Modified to add rotorcraft 
comments and define study variable. 
 
 
 
Aircraft physical damage.  The damage to an aircraft varies by the type of 
accident and its interaction with the environment at the time.  According to the NLR 
report (2001), the severity of the accidents included in their research model that involved 
CFIT were found to be catastrophic in nature.  This is an indication that a CFIT is more 
likely to result in the loss of the aircraft whether on impact with the terrain or by the 
resulting post-crash fire.  To determine the value of the damage, the value of a similar 
aircraft at the time of the crash was retrieved from the industry’s current primary sources 
of the data, the HeliValue$, Inc. Helicopter Blue Book, or Aircraft BlueBook and 
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multiplied by the percentage associated with the level of damage as expressed by 
Equation 2. 
 
CD = Aircraft Value * Damage Percentage (severity based)                      (2)   
 
Possible loss of resale value.  Collisions with obstacles such as transmission 
poles, wires, and towers that do not result in the loss of the aircraft require the operator to 
incur restoration costs.  Čavka & Čokorilo (2012) have recommended estimating a loss in 
value of 5 percent on its value on the date of the accident.  The value of the aircraft at that 
point was determined from the HeliValue$, Inc. Helicopter Blue Book or Aircraft 
Bluebook. 
 
CR = Aircraft Value * 0.05                                                  (3) 
 
Aircraft loss of use.  After an accident, an aircraft assessed to have experienced 
minor, moderate, or major damage is transferred to a facility for repairs.  The 
unavailability of the aircraft will necessitate the leasing of another aircraft for the 
organization to meet its operational needs.  The lease period is dependent on the extent of 
the damage to the aircraft under repair and type of aircraft.  The costs associated with the 
lease can be estimated with Equation 4. 
 
                    CL = Monthly Lease * Number of months                                  (4) 
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The monthly lease costs will vary based on the aircraft type, age of the aircraft, and other 
conditions as determined by the lessor.  For the study, the average monthly lease cost was 
determined by aircraft category and based on rates sourced from current aircraft leasing 
companies and applicable literature.  
Death and injuries.  A review of existing literature and current practices in 
various countries shows that the Value of a Statistical Life (VOSL) has been used when 
estimating the compensatory costs for occupational deaths and injuries.  The safety costs 
associated with a fatality (CF) were set at the 2015 VSOL level of $9.4 million and that of 
an injury, at the value evaluated with the application of the relative disutility factor to the 
VOSL.  The relative disutility factor, previously given in Table 3, was based on injury 
severity as set by the U.S. Department of Transport (2015). 
 Loss of staff investment.  In addition to the costs related to death and injury 
incurred in an aircraft accident, the operator is likely to incur additional costs for the 
replacement of crew.  Replacement costs include the advertising, recruitment, 
interviewing, screening, hiring, management, and effective training of a pilot to 
accomplish the same duties as the deceased pilot.  Due to the limited literature on the cost 
incurred when hiring a replacement rotorcraft, research on other fields was done.  
According to Boushey and Glynn (2012) of the Center for American Progress (CAP), the 
cost of replacing an employee earning $75,000 or less annually is approximately 20.4% 
of the base salary and 21.4% when all employees from the case studies reviewed are 
considered.  
Applebaum and Milkman (2006) determined that high paying jobs at senior or 
executive levels tend to have high replacement costs as a percentage of the salary.  They 
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found that for a lower level executive at a consumer products company’s corporate 
headquarters earning $125,000 dollars, the replacement cost is about $185,000.  For a 
middle level manager earning $50,000 to $125,000, the cost ranged from $98,000 to 
$117,000.  At a client services company, replacement costs were found to be about 1.5 
times the base salary of an employee earning over $100,000.  Considering the specialized 
training required for rotorcraft pilots and the estimated average pay for an aircraft pilot 
being $119,360 (BLS, 2016), this study employed a replacement cost of $179,040.  This 
was equivalent to 1.5 times the average pay of a pilot.  
Indirect costs.  Unlike the direct costs, indirect costs (CIN) are the hidden costs 
that result from internal systems of the organization adapting to the accident.  According 
to the U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) (2007), indirect costs 
refer to the production time lost by the employee, fellow workers, and supervisors; 
unhappy customers; cleanup time; schedule delays; training new employees; overhead 
costs; legal fees; and increase in insurance costs.  The costs identified in the ASTER 
report (NLR, 2001) and considered as indirect costs in previous research are difficult to 
estimate as are those identified by OSHA.  
To facilitate the evaluation of safety costs, researchers have adopted an indirect to 
direct costs ratio, and they vary greatly.  OSHA has a ratio of 1-to-1.1 when direct costs 
exceed $10,000 while Čavka & Čokorilo (2012) range the costs from 5 to 140 percent, 
dependent on the accident severity.  Scuffham et al. (2002), using the Human Capital 
(HC) approach assigned a ratio of 1-to-4.9 and with the Willingness to Pay (WTP) 
approach assigned a ratio of 1-to-5.41 for accidents in New Zealand.  Manuele (2011), in 
63 
 
 
his quest to find a more reliable ratio, evaluated the different methods and sources used to 
determine the ratios found in existing literature.  
 A study by Manuele (2011) found that in some cases the ratios were based on 
decades-old data that do not reflect the growth of direct costs at a higher rate than indirect 
costs in recent times.  Examples of the ratios included the 4:1 recommended by the 
Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters (Ontario Division) and Workplace Safety and 
Insurance Board in The Business Results Through Health and Safety Guidebook, ASSE’s 
Journal of SH&E Research in which Choi (2006) suggested indirect costs were two to 20 
times the direct costs, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service noted that $4 to $10 were spent 
on indirect costs for every dollar of direct costs, and the International Safety Equipment 
Association’s estimated indirect costs were up to 30 times the direct costs.  He opined 
that safety practitioners have commonly used the ratio 4:1 for indirect to direct costs of 
accidents to inform management on total accident costs and there was a need to rethink 
the ratio.  It was observed that the ratio reduced as the direct costs continued to increase.  
Manuel (2011), using the available data, updated the calculations in the Stanford 
University’s Department of Civil Engineering 1981 Technical Report No. 260 to the 
Business Roundtable and determined that a ratio of 0.8:1 of indirect to direct costs was 
more appropriate.  He also argued that a safety professional assuming a ratio of 1:1 can 
be reasonably comfortable with it and should avoid using higher ratios for which 
supporting data is not available.  Based on the research done by Manuele (2011) and 
OSHA (2007), this study applied a ratio of 1:1. 
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Safety costs (CA) for each rotorcraft accident were calculated by totaling the costs 
in the different categories identified with the variables in Table 5 and as expressed with 
Equation 5.  
 
CA = (CD + CR + CL + CF + CI + CP + CIN)                                     (5) 
 
For a detailed evaluation of the expected ROI for CFIT accidents, the safety costs 
were evaluated with the assumption that the pieces of equipment are adopted within an 
integrated avionics suite with the capability to mitigate collision with terrain and objects 
such as wires, transmission towers, and poles.  The goal of the IHST at its creation in 
2005 was to reduce the number of accidents worldwide 80% by 2016.  Current data 
shows that since 2006, an accident reduction of 24 percent to up to more than 50 percent 
has been achieved in key global regions, while the accident rate has decreased within a 
range of 40 to 60 percent.  During this time, the worldwide fleet also grew by 30 percent 
(IHST, 2016).  
In the fixed-wing world, as previously stated, CFIT accidents were reduced by 
80% when TAWS was adopted and implemented.  Aiming to achieve the same success as 
the fixed-wing segment, the probability of a CFIT occurring after the CFIT-avoidance 
technology has been adopted will be expected to reduce 20 to 80 percent from current 
accident levels.  The probability of an accident (accident rate) during the period under 
consideration was determined by applying Equation 6. 
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                             (6)                                 
                                                                                                                             
 
The historical flight hours data for U.S. rotorcraft data over the same period were sourced 
from the USHST, the FAA, and the ASCEND database. 
The calculated accident rate (probability) and accident safety costs were utilized 
to determine the estimated safety costs (CS) that can be avoided as the CFIT-avoidance 
technology is adopted more broadly as mitigation for the accidents.  Costs avoided with 
this risk mitigation strategy within a safety management system perspective were 
estimated by applying Equation 7. 
 
CS = CA * PCFIT *ΔR*FHs                                                   (7) 
 
where: 
PCFIT = Probability of a CFIT-accident occurring.  
ΔR = Reduction in CFIT-accident probability.  Probability is expected to 
gradually decrease as the number of aircraft with the technology increases. 
FHs=Projected fleet flight hours (January 2107 through December 2026). 
 
Net Benefit.  In a cost-benefit analysis, the established evaluation of the monetary 
difference between the pros (benefits) and cons (costs) on the implementation of a project 
or activity is termed as the net benefit (Guzman & Asgari, 2014).  An ROI analysis in the 
same manner considers all tangible costs and benefits.  By adopting CFIT-avoidance 
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technology, the industry is expected to see a reduction in (or avoid) the accident safety 
costs being currently experienced.  The net benefit for adopting collision avoidance 
equipment can be expressed as:  
 
             Net Benefit = (CS – CT)                                                              (8) 
where: 
CT = Technology adoption costs. 
 
Technology Adoption Costs  
The adoption of rotorcraft safety technology, like any other technology, comes 
with costs.  The costs are of two types: (1) non-recurring costs that include the initial cost 
of the equipment, its installation, and initial training for the users, and (2) recurring 
operational costs over the equipment’s lifecycle (e.g. maintenance and proficiency training).  
To evaluate the costs that an operator is likely to experience, requests for information were 
made to the aircraft manufacturers, equipment vendors, and training centers on the current 
rates they were charging for the various services.  Additionally, an analysis of the available 
pricing data from the catalogs, advertisements, vendor quotes, or websites of the equipment 
manufacturers and vendors was done.  With the components being currently available to 
customers, it was assumed that the pricing associated with the acquisition and installation of 
the equipment has factored in the research and development costs and profit margins.  These 
cost estimates should account for variability in pricing for the manufacturers or vendors 
(Department of Transport, 2013; Johnson & Avers, 2012).  The CFIT-avoidance technology 
adoption costs, denoted as CT, were determined by employing Equation 9. 
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CT = (CE + CI + CT + CM)                                                    (9) 
 
where: 
CE = Equipment acquisition costs. 
CI = Equipment installation costs. 
CT = Training costs for users.   
CM = Recurrent maintenance costs.   
 
The equipment under consideration for this study will have the capability to 
provide information on terrain, altitude, weather, and obstacles (transmission lines, masts, 
towers, structures, etc.).  For example, an avionics suite with EGPWS/HTAWS that 
integrates obstacle data from a warning database system such as WireWatch® will be 
considered a comprehensive solution to mitigating CFIT accidents.  According to Connor 
(2014), the leading avionics producers: Sandel, Garmin, and Honeywell, have created 
HTAWS equipment capable of producing warnings to pilots on wires, cables, and power 
lines when integrated into a helicopter’s avionics suite.  From these manufacturers, three 
types of HTAWS equipment will be considered: Sandel ST3400H-001 HeliTAWS, 
Garmin HTAWS 010-HTAWS-00, and Honeywell Mark XXI or XXII.  Using data 
collected from the manufacturers, vendors, and approved installers, the technology 
adoption costs (CT) for the equipment will be analyzed to determine the range for costs 
over which an operator is likely to incur to acquire and use any of the technology.   
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ROI Estimation  
For the second phase, a Monte Carlo simulation was performed to estimate the 
ROI based on the selected criteria.  The Monte Carlo Method or simulation was selected 
as a means of visualizing all the possible outcomes of the decisions that are made on the 
adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology.  The Monte Carlo simulation is a computerized 
mathematical technique that allows one to account for risk in quantitative analysis and 
decision making and has been employed widely in the engineering, finance, and aviation 
industry projects (Blom, de Jong, & NLR, 2006; Henry, Schmitz, Kelbaugh, & Revenko, 
2013; Wang, Chang, & El-Sheikh, 2012).  The estimated ROI from the simulation will be 
based on Equation 1 which has been expanded with the safety cost categories.  
Monte Carlo simulation.  The simulation was performed in Microsoft Excel®.  
The variation represented by the possible reduction in the probability of occurrence of a 
CFIT accident, the technology adoption costs (CT), and the aircraft safety costs (CS) 
incurred in an accident influenced the ROI.  To perform the simulation, the three 
variables applied in the ROI analysis were calculated and their ranges defined with a 
frequency distribution.  The distribution for each variable was determined from the 
descriptive statistics. The CS were calculated as a product of the number of accidents 
avoided with a reduction in the accident rate and the accident costs (CA).  The ROI values 
were calculated with the CS and CT as uncontrollable probabilistic inputs.  The 
probability of a CFIT accident occurring was determined by the number of incidents 
divided by the flight hours accumulated over the given period of interest.  A reduction of 
this probability by up to 80% when CFIT-avoidance technology is adapted was assumed 
to be in line with reduction achieved in the fixed-wing segment and target set by the 
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JHST for all rotorcraft accidents.  The technology adoption costs, calculated using data 
from different vendors, suppliers, and manufacturers, were evaluated to determine the 
distribution using the descriptive statistics: minimum, median, and maximum values. 
In the spreadsheet simulation setup, the initial conditions for the variables of each 
aircraft category: the rotorcraft accident costs, current CFIT-accident rate, projected flight 
hours for the period 2017-2026, and the technology adoption costs were added.  Using 
the projected flight hours and accident rate, the number of accidents that are likely to be 
avoided was calculated.  The accident rate value was randomly selected based on a 50 to 
80 percent reduction of the current accident rate.  This value was then multiplied with the 
CA to generate the CS value.  The CS value and a randomly selected CT value were 
applied in the ROI formula.  The process was repeated over 5,000 iterations in each 
simulation run to ensure that all possible values of CS and CT likely to be experienced 
with a 50 to 80 percent accident rate reduction with 25 to 75 percent of the fleet installing 
the CFIT-avoidance technology equipment were considered.  For each rotorcraft 
category, the simulation was run several times and the results evaluated for consistency.  
The resulting ROI values were used to generate frequency distributions and boxplots to 
display the range over which operators or the industry are likely to achieve the ROI with 
the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology.  
Population/Sample 
The population for the study consisted of all accident reports on U.S. general 
aviation rotorcraft accidents that were determined to have resulted in a CFIT as defined 
for this study.  The accidents considered occurred in the time period between January 1, 
2005, and December 31, 2015.  The accident reports considered had a finalized status 
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identifying the probable cause and safety recommendations, where applicable.  The start 
of the time period was selected to mark the 10-year period in which accident 
investigations for the accidents were expected to be complete and prior to the FAA 
mandated date for all HAA rotorcraft to have GPWS/TAWs installed.  
Sources of the Data 
The source of data was the NTSB accident / incident database which is considered 
the official U.S. government repository of the aviation accident reports generated from 
NTSB investigations.  The study was limited to those events that were considered an 
accident, which by definition is an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft 
which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of 
flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or 
serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage (NTSB, 2013).  The 
reports were grouped into three categories based on their status: preliminary, factual, and 
probable cause with the latter providing a detailed description of the accident and 
identifying the causal factors.  The reports were also used to verify the accident 
outcomes, operations category by FAR, weather conditions, and rotorcraft information as 
retrieved from the NTSB Microsoft Access® database.  The Helivalue$ Inc. Bluebook 
and the Aviation Week Network Aircraft Bluebook were utilized for determining the 
value of the rotorcraft at the time of the accident.  To determine the CFIT-avoidance 
technology adoption costs, the relevant data by category were acquired from the 
equipment manufacturer and vendor websites, marketing material, industry publications, 
and related material through appropriate data searches.   
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Data Collection 
The data required for the study was acquired from the NTSB Microsoft Access® 
database with the various coded information fields and downloaded to a Microsoft Excel® 
spreadsheet.  The spreadsheet was modified with the addition of new fields for Aircraft 
Category (turboshaft or piston single, turbine single, turbine twin, and heavy) and 
Accident Type (Terrain or Obstacle).  The accident reports in Portable Document Format 
(PDF) were retrieved and, together with the rotorcraft manufacturers’ product data 
specification information, were also used to complete the fields.  To retrieve the data, a 
search was performed through the NTSB accident database web search engine using key 
words and phrases that included: CFIT, terrain, obstacles, water, wires, wire strike, power 
line, and transmission lines.  The reports were reviewed to determine if the accident met 
the criteria of a CFIT accident and was applicable to the study.  For example, accidents 
resulting from a system failure or loss of control in flight were excluded.  
To determine the safety costs associated with each accident, new fields were 
added for each safety cost category identified and calculated by applying the appropriate 
formulas and the values in Table 5.  For each rotorcraft category, the descriptive analysis 
was performed, calculating the minimum, mean, median, and maximum values.  The 
analysis function in the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was used to perform the analysis.   
The data required for the CFIT-avoidance technology adoption costs were 
acquired from the equipment manufacturer and vendor websites, marketing material, 
industry publications, and related material through appropriate data searches.  The data 
was transferred into a Microsoft Excel® spreadsheet and the costs determined by applying 
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the appropriate formulas.  The data analysis function in the spreadsheet was used to 
perform the analysis. 
Determining the probability or the accident rate of a CFIT accident was based on 
the number of hours flown by the commercial U.S. rotorcraft fleet.  This information was 
retrieved from the FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Year 2011-2031 and 2016-2036 
(FAA, 2017).  The flight hours and number of accidents for each rotorcraft category were 
used to calculate the accident rate using Equation 6. 
Reliability.  The reliability of a study refers to the ability for one to obtain the 
same results in a consistent and repeatable manner.  NTSB reports have been repeatedly 
used for various studies as the information provided by them is considered reliable, and 
reports follow a common reporting format.  The report’s narrative, probable cause and 
findings plus wreckage and impact information, was used to classify the accident as 
terrain or obstacle related.  The accident reports in some cases though do not clearly state 
the primary cause when multiple causes or contributory factors were identified.  
Accidents were determined to be CFITs if the pilot still had control of the rotorcraft when 
collision with the terrain or obstacle occurred.  Due to the population size, sampling was 
not done, and all reports were used for the analysis.  The ASTER report has been used in 
previous studies and is considered reliable for defining the cost categories associated with 
aircraft accidents.  The report was the work product of the ASTER Consortium led by the 
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR with input from select industry regulators and 
partners.  Aircraft historical values and categories from the Helivalue$ Inc. Bluebook and 
the Aviation Week Network Aircraft Bluebook have been consistently used in the 
73 
 
 
industry for varying analysis.  The ROI methodology has been used in various forms in 
the transport industry and is adapted to the rotorcraft segment for this study.  
Validity.  The validity of a study refers to whether one is measuring what has 
been defined as the subject matter being measured.  Internal validity was established by 
using a proven ROI formula that has been applied in various industries including aviation 
by CASR and FAA.  The formula was modified for use in this study with variables (cost 
categories) defined in the NLR ASTER reports and applied in aircraft safety costs 
research on the Airbus A320.  The ROI formula applied for the study can also be used for 
other aviation safety studies where determining the costs and benefits of equipment or 
technology acquisition is required.  The external validity of the study, which refers to the 
ability to generalize the results to the entire population, was not considered a concern 
since the study employs the entire population of CFIT accidents.  The derived ROI 
estimation methodology went beyond the cost-benefit evaluation of accident costs 
avoided by adopting safety technology, and its results advise the industry on the 
estimated value created by doing so.  The methodology can be applied for other transport 
sector initiatives such as automotive safety and transport security equipment. 
Content validity was established by utilizing the NTSB safety reports to 
determine whether the cause of the accident was a CFIT related to collision with terrain 
or obstacles.  In cases where more than one probable cause of the accident may be 
identified, the CFIT should be the primary failure.  The CFIT should not have been the 
result of a different preceding factor such as structural, system, or engine failure.  
Additionally, the Helivalue$ Inc. Bluebook and the Aviation Week Network Aircraft 
Bluebook were used to determine the rotorcraft category and values.  These resources 
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have been used in the industry for years for this purpose.  By limiting the reports to the 
specified period between January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2015, consideration 
was given to a period where EGPWS / TAWS were available for use in some form and 
when the mandate had not been implemented. 
Treatment of the Data 
The data related to rotorcraft CFIT accidents for the period of interest was 
downloaded from the NTSB Microsoft Access® aircraft accident database to a Microsoft 
Excel® spreadsheet by performing a search using key words and phrases that included: 
CFIT, terrain, obstacles, water, wires, wire strike, power line, and transmission lines.  
The spreadsheet was edited to retain the data fields shown in Table 4.  More data fields 
were added to facilitate the calculation of the aircraft safety costs represented by the 
variables in Table 5 and to identify the different categories of the rotorcrafts: 
reciprocating single / piston, turbine single, and turbine twin.  The accident reports were 
reviewed to determine if the accident was primarily a CFIT accident not the consequence 
of another cause such as mechanical failure.  The report’s narrative, probable cause, 
findings, wreckage, and impact information was used to classify the accident as a CFIT 
and identify the outcomes such as fatalities, injuries, non-injuries, and airframe damage.   
A second spreadsheet created for the calculation of technology adoption costs had 
fields for: the technology nomenclature, the equipment cost, training costs, installation 
costs, and recurring maintenance costs.  The addition of more fields was dependent on 
additional cost categories that were determined critical to the adoption of the technology.  
The quantitative data was acquired from the equipment manufacturer and vendor 
websites, marketing material, industry publications, and related material through 
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appropriate data searches.  Using the data analysis function in the spreadsheet, the 
descriptive statistics were generated.  
Descriptive statistics.  Descriptive statistics were used in the study to determine 
the distribution of the variables for calculating the ROI: accident costs (CA) and 
Technology costs (CT).  The CS was calculated by multiplying the accident costs (CA) 
with the number of accidents likely to be avoided with the adoption of the safety 
technology.  Descriptive statistics were also used to gain an understanding of the 
individual cost categories of the accident costs.  For the Monte Carlo simulation, a 
random value was selected from each variable’s distribution, and the ROI was evaluated 
and results recorded.  Multiple iterations of this calculation were performed with different 
randomly-selected values.  The results of the ROI, in the form of a distribution, were used 
to describe the estimated ROI that can be achieved as the probability of a CFIT changes 
over time as a result of adopting the CFIT-avoidance technology.  
Qualitative data.  The qualitative data for the study were extracted from the 
NTSB accident investigation reports to advise the probable cause of the accidents.  The 
probable cause and findings section of the accident reports documented all the causes.  
The accident reports with a CFIT outcome were retained and analyzed to determine that 
the CFIT was the primary probable cause or one of the probable causes and not a 
secondary outcome after a different cause such as mechanical failure.  The qualitative 
data did not require further classification or coding as the accident outcomes and 
probable cause(s) were already determined by the NTSB accident investigators.  A 
column was added in the spreadsheet in which the CFIT accidents were further 
categorized as obstacle, terrain, or wire-strike based on the report narrative.  The review 
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of the qualitative data ensured that only CFIT accidents were considered and grouped by 
the correct rotorcraft category, thereby improving the accuracy of the model.  Rotorcraft 
categories were assigned based on the Helivalue$ Inc. Bluebook, Aviation Week 
Network Aircraft Bluebook, and the rotorcraft OEM grouping of each aircraft.  
This mixed methods study used historical CFIT-related accident reports to 
identify accident outcomes and estimate the associated accident costs while also 
collecting available data to estimate the technology adoption costs to estimate the 
potential ROI that could be achieved when CFIT-avoidance technology is broadly 
adopted.  The accident cost categories were based off categories used in previous 
research by Čavka & Čokorilo (2012) and modified for rotorcraft.  The ROI formula, which 
is a ratio of the net benefits to the costs incurred to achieve those benefits was applied.  The 
net benefits were calculated as the accident costs avoided by adopting the technology while 
the costs represented the costs likely to be incurred when acquiring, installing, and operating 
the equipment.  The ROI results were generated as multiple iterations of a Monte Carlo 
simulation.  The study considered different categories of rotorcraft and the results for each 
are discussed in the following section. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The purpose of this study was to estimate the potential ROI that could be achieved 
if the readily available CFIT-avoidance technology is more widely adopted by the 
helicopter industry and a reduction in the accident rate was achieved.  Accident reports 
were analyzed to determine whether they were CFIT related, based on FAA’s (2003) 
definition of a CFIT accident as one that occurs when an airworthy aircraft is flown, 
under the control of a qualified pilot, into terrain, water surface, or obstacles, with 
inadequate awareness on the part of the pilot of the impending collision.  In addition, the 
costs associated with the accident outcomes were evaluated, based on the applicable 
categories defined in Chapter 3.  The accident reports examined were those from the time 
period between January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2015. 
Treatment of the Data and Procedures 
Accident reports were retrieved from the NTSB aviation accident database and 
used for this study (NTSB, 2017).  To determine which reports were to be analyzed, 
queries using key search words were performed in the Microsoft Access® database for 
helicopter accidents within the period of interest.  Terms used included: (a) CFIT, (b) 
(H)TAWS, (c) wire strike, (d) terrain /ground (e) obstacles, (f) water, (g) power and 
transmission lines, (h) ground proximity, and (i) radar/radio altimeter.  The data returned 
from the queries were downloaded as Extensible Markup language (XML) files which 
were subsequently imported into a Microsoft Excel® file.  A total of 1,760 records were 
imported. 
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The merged records were further reviewed by the researcher for quality (missing 
data) and to determine those to be retained for the analysis.  The review revealed that the 
use of multiple search terms resulted in duplicate records for the same accident.  
Microsoft Excel® data tools were used to delete the duplicate records by comparing 
entries in the Event ID category of variables, reducing the number to 256.  The accident 
reports, in PDF format, associated with these records were retrieved.  For each report, the 
probable cause and findings were reviewed by the researcher to determine if the accident 
was CFIT related based on the analysis of the accident investigators.  To facilitate the 
tracking of accidents that were to be excluded from the analysis, a new variable Accident 
Type was added.  Accidents determined to be non-CFIT in the following categories were 
eliminated: (a) loss of control in flight, (b) loss of engine power, (c) dynamic rollover, (d) 
external load event, (e) mechanical failure, (f) in-flight collision, and (g) hard landing.  A 
detailed look at the aircraft make and model showed that 16 were ex-military aircraft, for 
example, the UH-1 and OH-58 variants.  These aircraft were remanufactured by an 
independent organization (not original equipment manufacturers).  These aircraft were 
excluded from the analysis due to the limited information on the configuration and CFIT-
avoidance equipment that would be appropriate for installation.  
 For the analysis, the technology adoption costs were evaluated with data collected 
from equipment manufacturer and vendor websites, marketing material, industry 
publications, and related material as needed.  The accident costs were evaluated based on 
the set criteria for each category in 2016 U.S. dollars.  Since future accident occurrence 
and equipment installation could not be attributed to a specific year within the ten-year 
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period, the evaluation was based on the 2016 values.  Therefore, general inflation or the 
aircraft and CTIF-avoidance equipment price inflation were not part of the evaluation. 
Descriptive Statistics 
A total of 112 accident records were retained and classified into three Accident 
Type categories: (1) CFIT, (2) CFIT-obstacle, and (3) wire strike.  The categorization of 
the accidents in this manner allowed for the use of the CFIT-obstacle category to capture 
all non-terrain or wire collision related accidents in one group, for example, collision 
with poles, lighted tower, and highway markers.  Figure 6 shows the distribution of the 
CFIT accidents, based on the prevailing weather conditions.  Wire-strikes were the most 
prevalent.  From the accident reports it was observed that in some accidents the pilots had 
an initial awareness of the presence of wires, and by losing sight of their location the 
rotorcraft wound up in a collision.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Accident type by weather condition. 
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The accident aircraft make, model, and engine type were used to categorize each into one 
of three groups: (1) Reciprocating or piston (light singles), (2) Turboshaft / Turbine 
single (light singles), and (3) Turboshaft twin or multi-engine turbine.  The light singles 
were separated into turboshaft and reciprocating in order to better reflect the variation in 
accident and technology adoption costs.  Turboshaft single category rotorcraft were found 
to have the highest number of accidents at 56, followed by the piston category with 46, 
and twin turbine with 10.  Fifty-four percent of the analyzed CFIT accidents were fatal.  
Accidents involving piston rotorcraft were 67 percent fatal and 41 percent of single 
turbine accidents were fatal.  Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of the accident aircraft 
by make and model and Figure 8 displays aircraft by engine type.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Accident count by aircraft make and model. 
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Figure 8.  Accident by year and engine type. 
 
 
 
The types of operations conducted at the time of the CFIT-related accident 
occurred were identified by the Purpose of Flight variable.  From the review of the data 
records in Excel®, it was noted that the purpose of the flight was either missing or the 
description was generic.  For the analysis, the Purpose of Flight descriptors such as Other 
work use and Positioning, where possible, were changed to provide a clearer indicator of 
the operation, while any missing ones were added.  Aerial application and observation 
was used to group different low altitude operations including power line surveillance, 
crop dusting, crop freezing prevention, cherry drying, and film or television production.  
Public aircraft represents operations performed by government owned aircraft or aircraft 
leased or contracted from the private sector for non-law enforcement purposes.  Aerial 
operations, personal, and HAA aircraft were the predominant operations during the 
occurrence of a CFIT related accident.  The distribution of the accidents by the Purpose 
of Flight is shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.  Accidents by purpose of flight. 
 
 
The Purpose of Flight provides insight into the diverse operations that are 
undertaken by operators but not into the regulatory requirements the operators would 
have been required to meet.  Rotorcraft are required to have specific equipment based on 
the operations they intend to perform and to do so in a safe manner.  An analysis of the 
Federal Air Regulations Description (FAR Description) variable was done to identify 
under which regulations the operations were being performed and are shown in Figure 
10. 
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Figure 10.  Accidents by FAR description. 
 
 
 
 Accident costs.  To estimate the costs rotorcraft operators were likely to 
experience as a result of a CFIT accidents, columns were added to the Excel® spreadsheet 
for each cost variable identified in Table 5 (See Appendix A).  Since the extracted data 
did not distinguish between pilot, passenger, or cabin crew fatalities, a column for pilot 
fatalities was added to separate them.  Upon separation, the pilot fatalities were used to 
determine the pilot replacement costs (CP) at a rate of $179,040 which was 1.5 times the 
average pay for a pilot in 2016 (BLS, 2016).  In their research, Applebaum and Milkman 
(2006) determined that the replacement costs of employees making over $100,000 was 
1.5 times the base salary.  The aircraft damage costs (CD) and loss in resale value (CR) 
were evaluated using the market-based value of the rotorcraft in 2016 U.S. dollars.  The 
aircraft model, series, and serial number were used to identify an aircraft within the same 
serial number range in the Helivalue$ Inc. Blue Book and its value.  Where the 
Helivalue$ data was not available, the Aircraft Bluebook® value was used.  These two 
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sources are considered the rotorcraft industry’s primary references of aircraft residual 
value for any given year. 
The loss of use (CL) cost was evaluated on the basis of an aircraft’s category 
(engine type and size).  All turbine singles were assigned the $85,000 monthly lease cost 
of a mid-size single engine rotorcraft, as previously given in Table 5.  A monthly lease 
cost of $42,500 for piston singles and $212,500 for medium (twin-engine) rotorcraft were 
used for the simulation.  The lease rates were estimated using the ratio of direct operating 
cost (DOC) of the Bell 47G (piston) and Bell 412SP (twin turbine) to the Bell 407 as 
evaluated in Conklin & de Decker’s Aircraft Cost Evaluator (ACE).  The DOC is 
considered a significant contributor to leasing costs and therefore can be an effective way 
of comparing operational costs of different rotorcraft.  By comparing the DOCs, the ratio 
was used to estimate the leasing costs of the piston and twin turbine rotorcraft. The 
helicopter flight rate charts from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service 
(2017) for helicopter services were used to validate the estimates. A conservative lease 
period of twelve months was determined by evaluating rotorcraft lead times, the period of 
time an operator would have to wait for a new or replacement aircraft from the 
manufacturer’s production line.  Aircraft lead times were found to range from 36 weeks 
to over 12 months depending on the aircraft size and customization requirements 
(Defence IQ, 2016; Duncan & Frank, 2007; Johnson, 2016;).  In the meantime, a leased 
aircraft would perform the desired operations.  The costs related to deaths and injuries 
and the indirect costs were also calculated.  The accident costs, CA, a sum of all the listed 
categories of costs for each accident was also calculated.  Table 6 presents a summary of 
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the accident costs for each category as analyzed for completeness, while Figure 11 shows 
the distribution of the CA for each rotorcraft category as applied in the simulation model. 
 
Table 6 
Accident Cost Categories  
R/C 
Category 
  Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Count 
Piston  
  
CD 20,250 364,800 104,079 57,011 46 
CR 0 22,800 5,509 4,241 46 
CL 67,560 125,400 93,965 29,129 46 
CF 0 37,600,000 6,947,826 9,593,279 46 
CI 0 1,974,000 282,613 537,545 46 
CP 0 358,080 77,843 104,412 46 
CIN 110,060 37,994,540 7,511,836 9,609,346 46 
CA
* 220,120 75,989,080 15,023,672 19,218,693 46 
            
Turbine- 
Single 
  
CD 139,200 2,240,000 515,028 393,409 56 
CR 0 85,250 25,818 23,087 56 
CL 1,020,000 1,020,000 1,020,000 0 56 
CF 0 47,000,000 9,064,286 13,167,846 56 
CI 0 2,961,000 501,557 879,645 56 
CP 0 179,040 63,943 86,565 56 
CIN 1,196,100 49,482,540 11,190,631 13,110,815 56 
CA
* 2,392,200 98,965,080 22,381,263 26,221,629 56 
            
Turbine- 
Twin 
  
CD 432,000 2,560,000 1,419,900 784,505 10 
CR 0 160,000 52,650 62,961 10 
CL 669,600 1,173,600 952,890 171,780 10 
CF 0 37,600,000 18,800,000 17,161,973 10 
CI 0 987,000 197,400 416,156 10 
CP 0 179,040 107,424 92,456 10 
CIN 1,627,460 40,302,520 21,530,264 16,897,601 10 
CA
* 3,254,920 80,605,040 43,060,528 33,795,203 10 
            
Note.  CD = Aircraft damage, CR = Resale value loss, CL = Loss of use (Leasing costs),  
CF = Fatality/Death costs, CI = Injury costs, CP = Loss of staff (pilot replacement) 
costs, CIN = Indirect costs, CA = Accident costs.  Costs evaluated in 2016 U.S. dollars. 
*Only CA values utilized in ROI simulation model. 
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Figure 11.  Rotorcraft accident costs, CA, distribution in millions. 
 
 
 
Technology costs.  Technology adoption costs were estimated using data 
retrieved from the catalogs, advertisements, vendor quotes, or websites of the equipment 
manufacturers and vendors.  Rotorcraft manufacturers were also considered to be vendors 
who retrofit the equipment in the fielded fleet and provide training as needed.  In some 
instances, to maintain a competitive advantage within the market, aircraft manufacturers and 
vendors provided a combined value for equipment acquisition and installation (CE + CI).  
Additionally, the equipment and aircraft manufacturers have suggested that recent 
advancements in electronic equipment technology have made the components more reliable, 
thereby minimizing the hardware maintenance costs. 
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The equipment mean time between failures (MTBFs), provided by manufacturers 
in the specifications, ranged from 4,850 to 10,000 hours.  The hardware maintenance costs 
claim was validated by applying the current recommended direct maintenance cost (DMC) 
methodology provided in the Helicopter Association International’s Economic 
Committee’s (2010) Guide for the Presentation of Helicopter Operating Cost Estimates 
2010.  With the equipment being repairable, the maintenance cost was approximately 
15% of the average equipment cost of $14,692.  Using the average MTBF of 7,425 hours, 
the DMC is $0.30 per flight hour (FH).  If the failure resulted in equipment being 
scrapped, the replacement cost would be $2.08/FH.  It was determined that the significant 
maintenance costs likely to be incurred are for the software updates and therefore were 
estimated for the life of the equipment.   
No mandatory regulatory requirements for training on the new equipment were 
found.  Pilots can use inexpensive ways to familiarize themselves with the equipment 
before using it as part of their recurrent and proficiency training.  Familiarization could 
range from reading manuals, computer-based training, simulator time, in-hangar 
instruction, or flights, depending on complexity and costs (Mayhew, n.d.).  Garmin offers 
the GTN 650/750 familiarization courses for $625 to $795, depending on the training 
location (Bergqvist, 2017).  For the analysis, the cost of training materials and two 
training flights was estimated to be $850 based on the evaluated average helicopter rental 
rate.  The total costs associated with the adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology (CT) 
were analyzed and summarized, as shown in Table 7.  Installation costs assumed the 
aircraft is configured to accept the new equipment, and no major overhaul of systems is 
required.  Due to its application being limited to military aircraft, the LOAS was not 
included in the equipment analysis. 
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Table 7 
CFIT-avoidance Technology Adoption Costs  
Equipment CE + CI CM CT CT2 
Radar Altimeters     
GRA™ 55 Radar Altimeter $9,096 $0 $850 $9,946 
GRA™ 5500 Radar Altimeter $13,545 $0 $850 $14,395 
RA-4000 Radar Altimeter $18,878 $0 $850 $19,728 
RA-4500 Radar Altimeter $13,922 $0 $850 $14,772 
King KRA 405B-15 Radar Altimeter  $16,699 $0 $850 $17,549 
          
TAWS     
Sandel ST3400H-001 HeliTAWS $16,422 $12,000 $850 $29,272 
Sandel ST3400H-001N $18,797 $10,200 $850 $29,847 
GTN-750 GPS/NAV/COM/ MFD HTAWS  $14,681 $12,470 $850 $28,001 
Honeywell Mark XXI  $21,765 $5,000 $850 $27,615 
     
Moving Maps     
GDL-69A Sat. Weather Sys. $4,369 $12,470 $850 $17,689 
GTN 750 GPS/COM/NAV with MD200-
306 Indicator 
$14,832 $12,470 $850 $28,152 
GTN 650 GPS/COM/NAV with MD200-
306 Indicator 
$11,696 $12,470 $850 $25,016 
EX600 MFDs w/ Bendix/King 
RDR2000/2100  
$13,715 $9,950 $850 $24,515 
FD540 TS GPS/NAV/COM w/ Wifi, & 
FLTA/RTC, Blk 
$17,276 $9,950 $850 $28,076 
          
Note.  CE = Equipment acquisition costs, CI = Equipment installation costs,  
CM = Recurrent maintenance, CT = Training costs, CT2 = Technology adoption costs.  
Costs evaluated in 2016 U.S. dollars. 
 
 
 
Accident rate.  To determine the number of accidents that can be potentially 
avoided through the adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology, the historical CFIT 
accident rate for the period of interest, January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2015, was 
determined.  The rotorcraft fleet size and flight hours accumulated over the given period 
were retrieved from the FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Year 2011-2031, Table 28 
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(FAA, 2017).  The CFIT accident rates for each rotorcraft category and all rotorcraft were 
determined and are presented in Figure 12. 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  CFIT accident rate per 100,000 flight hours (2005 to 2015). 
 
 
These accident rates, forecasted fleet size, and fleet hours, as detailed in the FAA 
Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Year 2016-2036, Table 29 (FAA, 2017), were used to project 
the number of CFIT related accidents that could potentially be incurred over the 10-year 
period 2017 through 2026.  Table 8 provides a summary of the flight hours and accidents.  
Single and twin turbine hours were estimated using the historical fleet distribution where 
approximately76 percent of the turbine fleet hours were accumulated on single engines.  
For the ROI simulation, the number of accidents avoided was determined by applying the 
anticipated 50% to 80% reduction in the CFIT accident rate.  This accident rate reduction 
was based on the 50% reduction achieved in fixed wing operations (FAA, 2011) and 
IHST reduction target for rotorcraft accidents of 80% (USJHST, 2010). 
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Table 8  
Projected Flight Hours and Accidents (2017-2026) 
 Flight Hours (10^5) Accidents 
Piston 83.66 46 
Turbine- Single 236.93 64 
Turbine - Twin 75.38 12 
 
 
 
ROI Simulation 
 The goal of the Monte Carlo simulation was to estimate the potential ROI that can 
be achieved through the greater adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology.  The Monte 
Carlo simulation, using the given bounds of variability expressed in the model, was used 
to compute the possible values of the ROI (Wang et al., 2012).  The ROI was determined 
using several variables: (1) the safety costs (CS), (2) the technology adoption costs (CT), 
and (3) the number of accidents avoided based on the expected accident rate reduction 
(ΔR) between 50 and 80 percent.  The accidents costs (CA) values randomly generated 
from the defined range were multiplied with the number of accidents avoided to calculate 
the CS values within the simulation model.  The accident rate was considered to be 
uncontrollable as it could vary randomly over the 10-year period to get to the targeted 50 
to 80% reduction.  The CA, as previously shown in Figure 11, exhibits an exponential 
distribution.  The simulation results were calculated using the minimum to maximum 
values of the frequency distribution of the uncontrollable CA and CT variables, with the 
assumption that each value was reasonably expected to occur.  For the simulation, the 
technology adoption costs (CT) estimates were based on the assumed percentage of 
aircraft in the respective fleet that would have been retrofitted with the technology by the 
year 2026.  For the simulation, a range of 25 to 75 percent of the fleet was considered 
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with the understanding that some of the fielded aircraft may already have the technology, 
and, inversely, not all operators will choose to adopt the technology based on financial or 
operational considerations.  This was reflected by the fact the equipment considered for 
adoption was not standard equipment on the rotorcraft but offered as an option kit or 
installed under supplemental type certificate by third party vendors.  The cost and fleet 
values used in the simulation are shown in Table 9 and Table 10, respectively. 
 
 
Table 9 
Aircraft Accident Costs (CA) and Technology Adoption (CT) Simulation Value. 
A/C Type 
CA 
Mean Min  Max SD 
Piston $15,023,672 $220,120 $75,989,080 $19,218,693 
Turbine - Single $22,381,263 $2,392,200 $98,965,080 $26,221,629 
Turbine - Twin $43,060,528 $3,254,920 $86,605,040 $33,795,203 
 CT 
 $22,469 $9,946 $29,847 $6,610 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Projected Rotorcraft Fleet Flight Hours (2017- 2026) and Fleet Size (2026) 
 
Flight Hours 
(10^5) 
Fleet 2026 
25% of 
Fleet 
50% of 
Fleet 
75% of 
Fleet 
Piston 83.66 4170 1043 2085 3128 
Turbine - Single 236.93 7036 1759 3518 5277 
Turbine - Twin 75.38 2149 537 1075 1612 
Note.  FAA forecast provides one value for the turbine fleet (9,185 aircraft for 2026).  
Single and twin turbine totals are estimated on historical ratios where singles are 
approximately 76% of the turbine fleet.    
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To calculate the estimated monetary costs and benefits operators should expect 
with the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology, the ROI formula, ROI = 
[CS – CT] / CT, was applied.  The ROI is a ratio of the difference between the accident 
costs avoided through accident reduction and the costs expected to be incurred to avoid 
them, considered the net benefits, and the same costs to be incurred.  The expected costs 
were estimated as the technology adoption costs (CT) likely to be incurred when the 
CFIT-avoidance equipment is installed in 25 to 75 percent of the fleet.  The benefits were 
estimated as the safety costs (CS) likely to be avoided with the reduction in the number of 
accidents.  In the simulation model, the CS values were calculated by multiplying the 
accident costs (CA) by the number of accidents avoided.  The number of accidents 
avoided (ΔR) were calculated by multiplying the current accident rate, projected flight 
hours for the period 2016 through 2027, and projected accident rate reduction percentage.  
The overall benefits were expressed as the ROI value for each scenario or iteration.  As 
an example, the piston category current accident rate of 0.56 was multiplied with the 
randomly selected percentage reduction rate to calculate the number of accidents avoided 
(ΔR).  This value was then multiplied with a randomly selected value of accident costs 
incurred for each accident (CA) to calculate the overall rotorcraft safety costs (CS) that 
would have been incurred for those accidents.  In the simulation, a random value with the 
range of technology costs, CT, was selected and multiplied with the estimated number of 
rotorcrafts within the fleet retrofitted with the CFIT-avoidance equipment.  The ROI 
formula was coded in the last column to record the values for each iteration.  A view of 
the simulation model setup with a sample of the ROI results for the piston category is 
shown in Table 11. 
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Table 11 
ROI Monte Carlo Simulation Setup and Sample of Results  
CA FHsa Accident Rate ΔR CSb CTb ROI 
$37,963,200 83.66 0.56 12 $450 $29 15 
$28,460,547 83.66 0.56 20 $556 $76 6 
$8,525,129 83.66 0.56 23 $195 $24 7 
$32,732,306 83.66 0.56 19 $610 $72 7 
$47,376,984 83.66 0.56 10 $467 $75 5 
$1,137,113 83.66 0.56 21 $24 $23 0 
$9,481,187 83.66 0.56 21 $198 $54 3 
$61,823,925 83.66 0.56 11 $708 $29 24 
$53,814,716 83.66 0.56 21 $1,115 $61 17 
$69,708,281 83.66 0.56 14 $943 $50 18 
$68,373,795 83.66 0.56 15 $1,048 $22 46 
$34,752,143 83.66 0.56 12 $425 $60 6 
$47,086,342 83.66 0.56 19 $897 $12 72 
$64,001,304 83.66 0.56 11 $697 $46 14 
$49,696,442 83.66 0.56 16 $811 $69 11 
$17,456,103 83.66 0.56 18 $315 $43 6 
$32,776,607 83.66 0.56 12 $400 $36 10 
$65,512,358 83.66 0.56 16 $1,066 $62 16 
$36,990,792 83.66 0.56 23 $843 $25 32 
$6,985,366 83.66 0.56 21 $145 $54 2 
$22,814,145 83.66 0.56 13 $306 $27 10 
$10,019,442 83.66 0.56 12 $117 $61 1 
$16,141,152 83.66 0.56 17 $270 $45 5 
Note.  aFlight hours (10^5), bCosts in Millions, ΔR=number of accidents avoided. 
 
 
 
 For the simulation to converge to a statistically significant result, 5,000 iterations 
of the ROI simulation were performed for each aircraft category.  After the simulation 
was terminated, the ROI results were analyzed and scatter plots generated.  Histograms 
with frequencies grouped in bins and box and whisker plots were also generated for 
easier visualization and interpretation of the distribution of the potential ROI that can be 
achieved.  For histograms, the area under each bar or bin reflects the number of 
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observations, while box plots, on the other hand, work with densities instead of 
frequencies or proportions with the area in the boxplot representing how dense the 
observations are within that interval.  The same number of observations in the histogram 
are represented in a larger or smaller area in the boxplot (Bakker, Biehler & Konold, 
2005).  Boxplots are also used to identify five key measurements: the smallest value, the 
first or lower quartile Q1, the median, the upper or third quartile Q3 and the largest value, 
while also identifying extreme values and outliers in a data set (Abuzaid & Mohamed & 
Hussin, 2012).  According to Hubert and Vandervieren (2008), boxplots provide 
information on the location, spread, skewness, and outliers of the data, and therefore the 
industry can get a good understanding of the potential ROI that can be achieved. 
The ROI value in each iteration is a representation of the benefits likely to 
experienced when a given number of rotorcraft accidents are avoided with the adoption 
of the CFIT-avoidance technology.  With the benefits and costs having the same 
monetary unit of measure, the resulting ROI value does not have a unit of measure.  The 
ROI values in this study were interpreted as the accident costs in U.S. dollars that are 
likely to be avoided for every U.S. $1 invested in adopting the CFIT-avoidance 
technology.  The results showed that a positive ROI would be achieved for each aircraft 
category except for the twin turbines, under certain conditions.  
Piston category.  The piston ROI scatter plot in Figure 13 shows that the 
adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology provides a positive return on investment for 
the industry with values densely populated between zero and 40.  As the ROI values go 
above 40, they become more scattered and become sparse above 60.  This scattering was 
a result of the safety costs being relatively high, an indication of multiple deaths and 
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complete loss of the airframe, with a relatively low investment on installing the CFIT-
avoidance technology.  
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Piston ROI scatter plot. 
 
 
 
The scatter plot in Figure 13 show that a positive ROI is likely to be achieved in 
most iterations but does not identify which ROI values are consistently observed.  To 
facilitate this assessment, the histogram was generated.  Results from multiple runs of the 
simulation indicated that the ROI values will consistently be grouped within a bin with an 
approximate of size 3, but the frequencies will vary.  The frequency represents the 
number of times the simulation will result in an ROI value within that given bin.  For this 
iteration, the values within the bins below 21 were found to have a frequency ranging 
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from 371 to 574.  Additionally, on all iterations, at least 53% of all ROI values were 
found to lie between zero and the median value of 14, as indicated with the red line and 
bin locations in Figure 14.  The bin with values between 2 and 5 represents the range 
within which most of the estimated potential ROI values lie.  The distribution was 
skewed right with a long tail of ROI values in the 123 to 126 bin which are considered to 
be outliers. 
 
   
 
Figure 14.  Piston ROI histogram. 
 
 
 
Though scatter plots and histograms are valuable in displaying the distribution of the ROI 
values, it is important to understand which ROI values are most likely to be achieved in 
order to support decision making by the industry.  To better understand the distribution of 
the ROI values, a boxplot was generated.  
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From the boxplot in Figure 15, the relatively narrower spread of values below the 
median, shown by the line within the box, than those above it, indicates that the data is 
skewed to the right and has a median value of 14.  With a first quartile (Q1) value of 6 
(indicated by the lower edge of the box) and third quartile (Q3) value of 24 (indicated by 
the upper edge of the box), the interquartile range (IQR) is 18.  The IQR is defined as the 
range within which the middle 50 percent of the data will lie and is an indicator of the 
variability of the ROI values.  Values above the upper and lower fences are considered to 
be outliers.  To determine the location of the fence (whisker), the IQR is multiplied by the 
standard constant k = 1.5 (Frigge, Hoaglin, & Iglewicz, 1989) and marked from the first 
or third quartile, as applicable.  With the data being skewed, values above 51 at the upper 
fence were determined to be outliers.  It was observed that the resulting box plot was 
narrow in nature, an indication that the resulting ROI values would exhibit less spread 
and be closer to the median of 14.  The high ROI values were achieved by having high 
safety costs that could be avoided with a reduction in the accident rate versus the costs of 
the technology.  
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Figure 15.  Piston category ROI boxplot. 
 
 
 
Turbine-singles.  The simulation was also performed for the turbine-single 
rotorcraft.  A scatter plot of the results in Figure 16 shows that higher ROI values can be 
achieved than in the piston category, with values being densely populated between zero 
and 40.  As the ROI increases, the values become sparser with few exceeding 80.  The 
high ROI values reflect the high accident costs avoided relative to the technology 
adoption costs.  The turbine singles are expected to have higher safety costs based on the 
seating capacity and value of the airframe. 
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Figure 16.  Turbine single ROI scatter plot. 
 
 
 
A histogram of the results was generated with the values grouped into bins with 
an approximate size of 4.  The bins with values below the median value of 19, indicated 
by the red line, were found to hold 53% of all ROI values, with each bin containing at 
least 500 values, as shown in Figure 17.  In this simulation, the 8 to 12 bin represents the 
range within which most of the estimated potential ROI values lie, with 564.  The 
distribution of the ROI values was skewed right with lower ROI values occurring at a 
higher frequency and a long tail of ROI values above 71 in bins with a frequency of less 
than 50.  The potential ROI that could be achieved in this category is comparable to the 
piston rotorcraft category, as they had the higher number of accidents that could be 
avoided while the cost of the technology remains relatively the same.   
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Figure 17.  Turbine single ROI histogram. 
   
 
 
With the frequency with which the ROI values are likely to be achieved now 
known, a boxplot was generated.  From the boxplot in Figure 18, it was observed that the 
relatively narrower spread of values below the median of 19 than those above it, indicates 
that the data is skewed to the right.  With a first quartile (Q1) of 9 and third quartile (Q3) 
value of 33, the interquartile range (IQR) is 24.  The IQR showed that the middle 50% of 
the turbine-single ROI values exhibited a larger spread than in the piston category, and 
therefore operators are more likely to achieve an ROI.  Values above 68, or the upper 
fence, equal to Q3 plus 1.5 times the IQR were determined to be outliers.  These are ROI 
values that are possible but unlikely to be achieved.  The high range was a result of the 
cost of installing the technology being significantly lower than the accidents costs 
avoided for multiple fatalities in a single turbine rotorcraft.  This boxplot, in the same 
manner as the piston category boxplot, was narrow, indicating that the ROI values would 
be densely populated around the median at 19 and close to the average ROI.  The 
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potential ROI values from the boxplot show that an accident rate reduction of 50% would 
put the industry in positive territory. 
 
 
 
Figure 18.  Turbine single ROI boxplot. 
 
 
 
Turbine-twins.  The simulation was performed for the third category, the turbine-
twin, and the ROI values were used to generate the scatter plot shown in Figure 19.  In a 
similar manner to the piston and turbine-single categories, the lower ROI values were 
densely populated and became sparse as the value increased.  ROI values were dense 
below 5 but began to become sparse above 10, with very few values above 20.  A closer 
look at the ROI values showed that the costs for retrofitting the CFIT-avoidance 
equipment into the rotorcraft (CT) would be relatively high compared to the costs likely 
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to be avoided with a reduction in the number of accidents.  The turbine-twin category, by 
virtue of having the lowest number of accidents during the period of interest, would have 
lower costs to be avoided compared to the costs to retrofit most of the rotorcraft fleet. 
 
 
 
Figure 19.  Turbine-twin ROI scatter plot. 
 
 
 
To get a better understanding of the distribution, a histogram of the results was 
generated with the values grouped into bins, 1 in size.  The bins with values below the 
median value of 3, indicated again by the red line, were found to hold over 55% of all 
ROI values with each bin containing at least 490 values, as shown in Figure 20.  The 
frequencies in these bins ranged from 490 to 607.  The 0 to 1 bin represents the range 
within which most of the estimated potential ROI values lie with 607.  The histogram 
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shows the data was skewed right with ROI values as high as 23 being realized at a very 
low frequency.  
 
 
 
Figure 20.  Turbine-twin ROI histogram. 
 
 
 
To determine the ROI values that are more likely to be achieved, a boxplot was 
generated.  The boxplot in Figure 21, like the previous boxplots, shows a relatively 
narrow spread of values below the median line than those above it, an indication that the 
data is also skewed to the right and had a median value of 3.  The ROI value for the first 
quartile (Q1) was 1 and third quartile (Q3) was 6.  The interquartile range (IQR) was 
therefore 5.  With the data being skewed, values above 12 on the upper whisker, equal to 
IQR*1.5 plus Q3, were considered to be outliers.  This was determined to be the category 
in which under certain scenarios a positive ROI is more likely not to be achieved as the 
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Q1 value (1) is close to zero.  The lower fence (whisker) value of -1 is considered an 
outlier but indicates the possibility of higher losses still exists. 
 
 
 
Figure 21.  Turbine-twin ROI boxplot. 
 
 
 
The results of the three ROI simulations showed positive ROI in most conditions.  
Consideration was therefore given to the ROI if the CFIT-avoidance technology was 
adopted broadly across all rotorcraft categories.  This simulation did not factor in the 
reason for adoption, whether voluntary or due to the regulations introduced by the 
regulatory authorities.  This simulation provided insight as to whether the industry would 
experience better returns if the adoption was targeted by all categories simultaneously.  
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The simulation was run, and the resulting ROI values were used to generate the scatter 
plot shown in Figure 22.  The ROI values were densely populated below 20 and became 
increasingly sparse too.   
 
 
 
Figure 22.  All rotorcraft ROI scatter plot. 
 
 
 
A histogram of the results was generated and the values grouped into bins with a 
size of 1.  The bins with values below the median value of 5, indicated again by the red 
line, held over 55% of all ROI values with each bin containing at least 490 values, as 
shown in Figure 23.  The bin with values between 0 and 2 represents the range within 
which most of the potential ROI values lie with 602.  The histogram shows the data was 
skewed to the right with ROI values as high as 47 being realized with a low frequency. 
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Figure 23.  All rotorcraft ROI histogram. 
 
 
 
The boxplot in Figure 24, again shows a relatively narrower spread of values below the 
median than those above it, which indicates that the data is also skewed to the right with a 
median value of 5.  The ROI value for Q1 was 2 and Q3, 9.  The interquartile range 
(IQR) was therefore 7.  With the data being skewed, values above 19 or 1.5*IQR+Q3 on 
the upper whisker were considered to be outliers.  The average of the ROI value was 6 
and a range of 49.  The average and median ROI values were seen to be close, and the 
industry should therefore expect the likely outcome to be close to those values.  As an 
outlier and unlikely outcome, a negative ROI can be achieved as indicated at the lower 
fence (whisker) value of -1.  These value are driven by the high technology costs when 
the number of accidents, and therefore accident costs, avoided are low.   
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Figure 24.  All rotorcraft ROI boxplot. 
 
 
 
According to Tang (2006), the opinion of leaders and stakeholders and the 
existing socio-economic conditions will impact the adoption of new safety technology.  
Since the technology has to be integrated into the existing fleet (older rotorcraft) as well 
as the new rotorcraft where the equipment is not installed as standard equipment, the 
technology adoption costs are critical, especially for the piston category rotorcraft which 
are on the lower price range.  In 2015, for example, a new R44 Beta II was priced at 
$456,000 and a R22 Beta II at $285,000 (HeliVaue$, Inc., 2015).  To understand the 
margin available for the existing fleet, the technology adoption costs were increased 
tenfold to a minimum of $99,460 and maximum of $298,468, and the simulation with all 
rotorcraft considered was performed.  A boxplot of the results, shown in Figure 25, was 
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generated.  The potential ROI values had a median of -0.4, a Q1 of -0.7, a Q3 of 0, and an 
IQR of 0.7.  The ROI values were skewed to the right as evidenced by the wider spread 
of the values above the median.  The average of the ROI value and the outliers, indicated by 
the lower and upper fences (whiskers), were 1.1 and -1 respectively.  The results show that a 
positive ROI is unlikely to be achieved when the increased technology adoption costs 
constitute as much as 35% of a new lower capacity piston aircraft such as the R22.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 25.  All rotorcraft ROI boxplot with increased technology adoption costs. 
 
 
 
The results of the potential ROI values for all the rotorcraft categories were 
evaluated and were found to have high ranges (IQRs).  A sensitivity analysis was 
considered but was not performed as all variables were not controllable.  The accident 
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costs (CA) for each category were found to have significant variation due to the variance 
within each of its individual cost categories, of which none were controllable.  The 
calculated safety costs (CS) applied in the ROI formula were therefore an uncontrollable 
variable as well as the technology adoption costs (CT).  Since the two variables were 
uncontrollable, the resulting median and high IQR values for the simulation run were 
considered representative of the ROI value likely to be achieved by the industry or 
operators with the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology.  
The most important finding from the ROI simulation for all three categories is the 
industry is more likely to achieve a positive ROI with negative ROI values being seen to 
be outliers on the boxplots.  For a negative ROI or losses to be incurred, the cost of 
installing the CFIT-avoidance equipment in the fleet would be significantly higher than 
the accident costs avoided.  The median ROI for the piston and turbine-single was 
significant at 14 and 19 respectively.  The twin-turbine category, with a median ROI 
value of 3, was seen to have a lower margin for positive return.  With regulatory changes 
having been introduced to address HAA safety, the number of twin turbine accidents 
could reduce by at least 40%, generating a ROI without making the additional push for 
the CIFT-avoidance technology adoption by all the operators.  This possibility shows the 
focus for the industry should be on the piston and turbine-single categories for which a 
higher ROI will be achieved when the technology is voluntarily adopted in large 
numbers.  The main driver of the ROI was the accident costs that could be avoided as 
direct costs, of which the loss of aircraft and fatality costs were the majority.  The results 
showed that even when only the direct costs are considered, the industry is still likely to 
experience a positive ROI.  When the indirect costs, which were estimated at a 1:1 ratio 
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to the direct costs, are individually quantified in the future, the ROI is likely to reduce but 
is still a positive return when the CFIT-avoidance technology is broadly adopted.  It was 
also observed that the ROI could be overstated, based on which direct to indirect costs 
ratio is selected. As discussed earlier, the direct to indirect costs ratio in previous research 
has varied from as low as 1-to- 4.9 in Willingness-to-Pay approach to as high as 1-to-30 
for the International Safety Equipment Association, as recognized by Manuele (2011). By 
applying the 1:1 ratio suggested by Manuele (20110 and OSHA (2007), conservative 
values of the ROI were determined.  
When all categories were considered, the potential ROI was positive largely due 
to the accident costs likely to be avoided in the piston and turbine-single categories.  
Consideration was given to the impact of higher technology adoption costs up to ten 
times the estimated technology adoption costs, and it was determined that the ROI was 
more likely to be negative.  A repeat of the simulation with lower increases of the 
technology costs was used to determine that an increase by any factor greater than three 
would result in a negative ROI.  It was determined that the rotorcraft industry can 
therefore anticipate a positive ROI on the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance 
technologies when the technology adoption costs are managed effectively.  
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current study estimated the potential ROI that could be achieved if the readily 
available CFIT-avoidance technology was to be more broadly adopted by the rotorcraft 
industry, resulting in a reduction in the number of accidents and costs that would be 
incurred.  A review of previous research revealed an existing gap with respect to the 
estimation of the benefits for operators and the industry when safety solutions were 
implemented.  Past research applied the cost benefit analysis with only the social or 
public benefits being evaluated.  A simulation model applying the ROI formula expressed 
as ROI = [CS – CT] / CT, was used.  The ROI was defined as the ratio of the difference 
between the safety costs likely to be avoided with a reduction in accidents and the technology 
costs to be incurred to avoid them and the technology costs.  The technology adoption costs 
(CT) are to be incurred when the CFIT-avoidance equipment is installed in 25 to 75 percent 
of the fleet.  The benefits were estimated as the safety costs (CS) likely to be avoided with the 
reduction in the number of accidents.  In the simulation model, the CS were calculated by 
multiplying the accident costs (CA) by the number of accidents avoided.  The CA were 
evaluated by estimating the different accident costs manifested in rotorcraft accidents.  The 
number of accidents avoided were calculated by multiplying the current accident rate, 
projected flight hours over the 2016-2027 period, and projected accident rate reduction 
percentage.  The study employed a mixed-methods research design conducted in two 
phases.  
In the first phase, data was extracted from the NTSB aviation accident database 
using key search words associated with CFIT accidents.  The accident reports associated 
with the records retained for analysis were also retrieved.  The cause descriptions 
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contained within the accident reports were analyzed to determine whether the accident 
was CFIT related and then classified into three Accident Type categories: (1) CFIT, (2) 
CFIT-obstacle, and (3) wire strike.  The accident reports examined were those in the time 
period between January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2015.  The extracted accident data 
were placed in a Microsoft Excel® file and used to calculate the accident costs, both 
direct and indirect, associated with the outcomes of each rotorcraft accident for the 
applicable rotorcraft categories: piston, turbine-single, and turbine-twin.  The direct costs 
included: aircraft physical damage, loss of resale value, aircraft loss of use, death and 
injuries, and loss of staff.  The indirect costs were estimated with a 1:1 ratio of the direct 
costs and were considered to cover: search and rescue, accident investigation, third party 
losses, loss of investment income, increased insurance, and loss of reputation.  In the 
second phase, costs associated with the adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology were 
calculated.  The technology adoption costs included: acquisition, installation, 
maintenance, and training.  With the costs defined, the simulation model was run and the 
results documented.  
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the results of the study and how the ROI 
results may influence decision making in the future for the rotorcraft industry and the 
general aviation industry as a whole.  The objective of the study was to provide an 
alternative method of evaluating the potential benefits of adopting existing and emerging 
technologies.  Recommendations for future research are also discussed. 
Discussion  
To address the first research question, the costs likely to be incurred by rotorcraft 
operators were calculated in the Excel® spreadsheet with each cost variable identified in 
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Table 5 considered.  An example of the results is provided in Appendix A.  For every 
accident, the costs of fatality (CF), injury (CI), pilot replacement (CP), aircraft damage 
(CD), loss in resale value (CR), and loss of use (CL) were evaluated.  The sum of these 
costs was the accident’s direct costs, and the same value was assigned to the indirect 
costs (CIN) as the direct and indirect costs were assumed to be incurred at the ratio of 1 to 
1.  The total accident costs (CA) were primarily driven by the fatality in all categories: 
$6.95 million (piston), $9.06 million (turbine-single), and $18.8 million (turbine-twin), as 
shown in Table 6.  Injury costs were the second highest contributor for the piston 
rotorcraft, loss of use costs for turbine-singles, and aircraft damage for turbine-twins.  
This observation showed that the size and design of the rotorcraft influences the costs due 
to survivability and value of the airframe.  Rotorcraft leasing costs were also seen to be 
high for turbine-singles and twins.  The key takeaway from the accident costs was that 
the adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology has the potential to reduce fatalities and 
their associated costs, which in all rotorcraft categories, exceed the second highest cost 
contributor by a factor eight to 24 depending on the category. 
 For the second research question, the estimated costs and benefits the industry is 
likely to experience with the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology were 
estimated by applying the ROI formula, ROI = [CS – CT] / CT, where the benefits were 
the estimated safety costs (CS) likely to be avoided with the reduction in the number of 
accidents, and the costs were the estimated technology adoption costs (CT) likely to be 
incurred when the CFIT-avoidance equipment is installed in 25 to 75 percent of the fleet.  
The CS was calculated by multiplying the accident costs (CA) by the number of accidents 
that would be avoided.  The number of accidents avoided was calculated by multiplying 
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the accident rate for the period between January 2005 and December 2015 with the 
projected flight hours for the ten-year period January 2017 between December 2026 and 
the randomly selected 50 to 80 percent reduction in the accident rate.  The turbine-single 
category with a projection of 64 accidents, and an average CA of $22.38 million was 
found to have the highest costs if the technology was not adopted broadly.  Assuming 
each accident incurred the average CA, the turbine-single fleet would accumulate $1.432 
billion in costs, almost twice as much as the piston fleet with $729 million from a 
projected 46 accidents.  The technology adoption costs, CT, were calculated by summing 
the equipment acquisition, installation, maintenance, and training costs for each 
equipment that was considered.  The total CT was calculated by multiplying a randomly 
selected value within the range shown in Table 9 and multiplied by 25 to 75% of the 
number of rotorcraft in which the equipment would be installed.  The ROI formula was 
used to perform 5,000 iterations and the results recorded.  Table 11 shows that the CS in 
most instances was relatively higher than the CT resulting in high positive ROI values as 
shown in the boxplots and histograms in Chapter 4 and discussed herein. 
 To address the third research question, do the ROI results support the broader 
adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology beyond HAA operations, the simulation results 
for the three rotorcraft categories were reviewed.  The results showed that the rotorcraft 
industry is more likely to experience a positive ROI than incurring losses and therefore 
support the broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology.  The value of the ROI was 
influenced not only by the possible outcomes of the accident, but also the category of the 
rotorcraft, number of accidents likely to occur, and the potential costs of the CFIT-
avoidance equipment.  From Table 6, the average fatality cost for any of the three 
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rotorcraft categories was over $6.98 million or at least 40% of the total accident costs.  
An increase in technology costs by a factor of three was found to result in a negative 
ROI. 
Return on Investment.  The projected ROI is a ratio of the rotorcraft accident 
costs that are likely to be avoided when CFIT-avoidance technology is adopted to the 
costs to be incurred when the fleet installs and utilizes the associated equipment.  The 
equipment, that includes radar altimeters and HTAWS/EGPWS, are not always part of 
the standard configuration and are therefore provided as optional kits.  The location and 
size of the bins or class intervals of the potential ROI values below the medians in 
Figures 13, 16, and 19 was an indicator that the rotorcraft industry was more likely to 
experience a positive outcome when the CFIT-avoidance technology is more broadly 
adopted.  In each category, over 53% of ROI values lay between zero and their respective 
median values of 14 for the piston, 19 for turbine-singles, and 3 for twin-turbines.  The 
likelihood of a positive ROI was also shown by the concentration of the potential ROI 
values around the median with IQR values of 18 for the piston, 24 for turbine-single, and 
5 for the twin-turbine, which were higher than the median.  The IQR represents the range 
in which 50% of the ROI values occur, in this case 2,500 for each rotorcraft category.  
Achieving a 25 percent or greater reduction in the CFIT accident rate for all rotorcraft 
would be a favorable outcome as the industry would experience a positive ROI with a 
median value of 5 and IQR of 7, as shown in Figure 24.  This positive ROI for all 
rotorcraft would be limited by an increase in the technology adoption costs when inflated 
by a factor of more than three.  When individual rotorcraft categories were analyzed, the 
ROI results boxplots in Figure 14, 17, and 20 showed that while the potential of a loss 
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exists, it was still unlikely since the ROI values at or near the lower whisker are 
considered outliers.  The twin-turbine category had the lowest margin for a positive ROI 
due to the high technology adoption costs that are likely to be incurred when retrofitting 
the fleet with CFIT-avoidance equipment to reduce an already low number of accidents.  
The potential ROI values for the rotorcraft categories, individual or combined, 
were considered reasonable based on the results of Canada’s Department of Transport 
(2011) analysis of the benefits of mandating an expanded adoption of TAWS equipment.  
With estimated costs of $59 million and benefits of $216 million, the estimated ROI, 
when the formula is applied, is 2.66.  James and Avers (2012), in their research on human 
factors safety interventions, demonstrated that a large maintenance organization could 
achieve an ROI of 312% over six quarters by delivering fatigue training resulting in and 
effecting a reduction of equipment damage and injuries.  Huang et al., (2009) based on 
2006 injury data, estimated that for every dollar invested in safety for the U.S. private 
industry, a return of $4.41 could be achieved.  High benefits-to-costs ratios were estimated 
for lane departure warning and roll stability control road transport safety systems for Class 7 
and 8 trucks at 14.69 to 4.95 and 12.50 to 4.7 respectively (Department of Transport, 2013).  
Using the ROI formula applied in the study, the lane departure warning and roll stability 
control road transport safety systems provided an ROI of 1.97 and 1.66 respectively.  With 
median ROI values of 14 for the piston, 19 for turbine-singles, 3 for twin-turbines, and 5 for 
all categories combined, the projected ROI values were considered to be reasonable.  
 Operators of single turbine rotorcraft are projected to experience the highest 
increase in the number of CFIT accidents, from 56 to 64, if the accident rate remains 
stagnant over the next 10 years through to 2026 (Table 8).  This category will have the 
largest fleet at 7,036 rotorcrafts and, by maximizing the number of aircraft that have the 
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CFIT-avoidance equipment, the industry can generate the highest ROI with a median 
value of 19.  This high ROI would be driven primarily by the occupant fatality (CF) and 
injury costs (CI), with an average of $9.06m and $0.5m likely to be avoided in a higher 
capacity rotorcraft.  An IQR of 24 of the ROI shown in Figure 17 indicates that there is 
room for the technology adoption costs to grow before the industry experiences a 
negative ROI.  It would therefore be reasonable for the industry to prioritize and 
accelerate the adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology by the single turbine rotorcraft 
operators.  The ROI results show that the accident rate, given in Figure 12, should not 
always be the primary deciding factor on which rotorcraft category should be prioritized 
for the broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology. 
 From an accident rate perspective, the piston category with the highest rate at 0.56 
would have been the category to address.  A comparison of the ROI showed that the 
piston category offers a lower return with a median ROI value of 14 compared to the 
single-turbine’s 19.  It was observed that the lost value of the rotorcraft given by aircraft 
damage (CD) and the occupant fatality (CF) played a significant role in the lower average 
accidents costs for piston aircraft at $15.86 million versus the single turbine at $22.4 
million, as shown in Table 9.  Single turbines, for example, the Bell 206 and Airbus 350, 
have a capacity of four to six occupants while piston rotorcraft such as Robinson R44s 
and Hughes 269 have a two to four occupant capacity (Aviation Week Network, 2016).  
Even with fewer accidents, the higher number of potential fatalities drives the accident 
costs and, conversely, the ROI when avoided.  The ROI therefore can be considered a 
good indicator for the industry on where the investment would be best prioritized.  For 
CFIT-avoidance technology, it is the single-turbine rotorcraft. 
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It was observed that with a low accident rate of 0.16, the cost of installing CFIT-
avoidance technology on at least 25 percent of the twin engine rotorcraft fleet will not 
always result in a positive ROI, as shown in Figure 20.  From the simulation results, in 
certain conditions, for example, a reduction of less than four accidents, the ROI can be 
less than zero (loss).  With a Q1 ROI value of 1 (Figure 20), this category has a low band 
for generating a positive ROI.  Table 8 shows that at the current accident rate, 12 of the 
projected fleet of 2,149 twin turbine rotorcraft through 2026 are likely to be involved in a 
CFIT accident.  Therefore, the cost of installing the technology to reduce the number of 
CFIT accidents by only four or 33% cannot be justified by the low ROI.  Eight of the 10 
twin turbines recorded in the simulation spreadsheet were involved in CFIT accidents 
while being used for HAA operations at the time.  The requirements introduced by the 
FAA with the Advisory Circular AC 135-14B Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations 
should suffice in the CFIT accident mitigation for this category of rotorcraft.  The 
requirements for HAA operations that were addressed include TAWS equipment, pilot 
testing, alternate airports, and increased weather minimums (FAA, 2015).  The change in 
HAA regulations is likely to generate a positive ROI on the twin-turbines prior to 
additonal investments by the non-HAA operators.  The mandate is likely to reduce the 
accidents by over four, the minimum required for a positive ROI.  
 The potential ROI median and IQR values of 14 and 18 for the piston category 
and 19 and 24 for the single turbine rotorcraft, shown in Figures 14 and 17, should 
provide the industry with a sizeable risk margin even though each cost category of the 
indirect costs associated with the accidents could not be individually determined.  The 
indirect costs were estimated by applying the 1:1 ratio of direct to indirect costs 
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recommended in research by Manuele (2011) and OSHA (2007).  These costs are 
associated with accident investigations, search and rescue, loss of investment, and loss of 
reputation, among others.  A decrease in the direct to indirect costs ratio would decrease 
the ROI by the same magnitude, and therefore only a simultaneous large increase in 
technology costs would cause a significant reduction in the ROI to the critical point of 
turning negative.   
 The results of the potential ROI for each individual category as well as for all 
rotorcraft provide support for the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology.  
The data show that the equipment, mostly avionics, are reliable, and their maintenance 
costs (CM) have a low impact on the technology adoption costs over the life of the aircraft 
(Table 7).  The range of the technology costs, CT, from $9,946 to $29,468, will give the 
operators in any rotorcraft category options on the equipment to install based on their 
resources or operational needs and still generate a ROI.  A ten-fold increase in the 
technology adoption costs resulted in a negative ROI, as shown in Figure 24, when all 
categories were considered.  Further investigation showed that operators should limit the 
increase to no more than three times for a positive financial impact.  Based on the ROI, 
the industry should determine whether the technology adoption should be prioritized 
based on category or FAR operations.  The additional requirements put in place for the 
HAA and other Part 135 operators, though optional for Part 91 operations, should be 
encouraged for the segment.   
 Accidents.  An analysis of the data extracted from the NTSB database was done, 
and 112 accident reports were retained for the study.  As shown in Figure 6, 88 percent of 
the CFIT accidents occurred during VMC operations in which a pilot is required to be 
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more attentive of the operational environment and to scan for possible obstacles.  This 
observation is consistent with the Nall report finding that over 88 percent of both 
commercial and non-commercial rotorcraft accidents from 2014 through 2016 occurred 
in VMC (Air Safety Institute, 2017a; 2017b).  Using the Accident Type category, it was 
observed that accidents involving wire-strikes were most prevalent at 48 percent, and 
almost all occurred frequently in VMC operations.  Pilots were seen to have an initial 
awareness of the presence of the wires, and on losing sight of their location, the rotorcraft 
wound up in a collision.  Those occurring in a VMC environment were a result of the 
pilot: (1) failing to maintain adequate clearance during low level operations, (2) 
experiencing loss of situation awareness in unfamiliar environment, (3) failing to identify 
and arrest the rotorcraft’s descent, and (4) deciding to perform low level flight in low 
visibility conditions in mountainous areas, over water, and snow covered terrain.  
Accidents that involved collision with terrain were the second highest at 22% with 12 of 
them occurring in IMC flight.  Inadvertent flight into IMC led to accidents as pilots were 
unable to re-establish a visual reference for their flight path thus emphasizing the need to 
adopt the CFIT-avoidance equipment broadly. 
 A review of the rotorcraft involved in the accidents revealed a need to break the 
light single category into two, the reciprocating (piston) and turboshaft (turbine) 
categories, in order to get a better understanding of the accident cost variations and ROI.  
The piston rotorcraft were mostly lower capacity aircraft and were involved in 50% of the 
accidents.  As shown in Figure 7, the piston accident fleet consisted of Robinson R22s, 
R44s, Bell 47s, and Hughes 269C, among others.  34 of these rotorcrafts, or 60%, were 
Robinson R22 and R44s, underscoring the popularity of these aircraft for low altitude 
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operations such as crop dusting, crop freezing prevention, cherry drying, and film 
production.  Over 90% of rotorcraft CFIT accidents involve single engine aircraft which, 
more often than not, are certified for VMC flight for which pilots are expected to scan 
their environment for terrain and other obstacles.  Ishihara (2005) had similarly observed 
that a high number of HEMS CFIT accidents occurred in VMC conditions.  Twin engine 
rotorcraft were less likely to be involved in a CFIT accident.  The HAI, AHS 
International, and GAMA teams in 2015 proposed the modification of Part 27 single-
engine IFR certification as a means of addressing the high number of inadvertent flight 
into IMC and CFIT accidents (Sandel Avionics, 2012).  The ROI results for the piston 
and single-turbine rotorcraft, which are mostly certified under Part 27, support the 
broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology. 
 In Figure 8, during the period of interest, it was observed that CFIT accidents 
were significantly higher over the first half, averaging 12 accidents per year.  In the 
second half, the average dropped to nine accidents per year.  The years 2008 and 2010 
had the highest accidents with 14, and 2008 also had the highest number of twin engine 
accidents with 4.  As the number of twin engine accidents reduced, the single turboshaft 
accidents spiked in 2010 to 11.  Between 2010 and 2015, pistons and turboshaft singles 
were seen to reverse positions in number of accidents.  This reversal could not be 
attributed to the variation in the rotorcraft utilization, as the fleet flight hours, as 
presented in the FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Year 2011-2031, Table 28 (FAA, 2017), 
did not show a significant fluctuation during that period.  The projected utilization 
between 2017 and 2026 (Table 8) reflects the same consistency, and without broader 
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adoption of the technologies, the accident rate will only reflect the impact of the 
regulations being implemented for HAA and other Part 135 operations.   
 Accident costs.  As expected in safety, accidents do come with the significant 
costs for an operator, organization, or industry.  For the rotorcraft industry, CFIT-related 
accidents incur an average of nearly $22.38 million in related costs (CA) for the 
turboshaft single category which had the highest occurrences.  The piston category, 
which is more likely to consist of individual and small fleet operators performing aerial 
operations and personal travel (Figure 9), the CA averages close to $15.86 million (Table 
10).  These operators are unlikely to have the bandwidth to bear such heavy losses.  For 
flight instruction rotorcraft, the costs could be even higher if the student pilot is already a 
qualified pilot, as the current CA costs only accounted for the loss of life but not the staff 
replacement costs.  When the accident rates shown in Figure 11 are put into 
consideration, the turbine category is seen as the highest driver of costs due to utilization 
and fleet size (Table 10).  These two rotorcraft categories represent the best opportunity 
for the industry to maximize its ROI by broadly adopting CFIT-avoidance technology.  
Aircraft damage and injury costs were also significant for all rotorcraft categories 
but were relatively low when compared to fatality costs.  The aircraft damage costs 
averaged between $104,079 and $1.42 million, while fatality costs averaged between 
$7.9 and $18.8 million for all categories (Table 6).  The lower aircraft damage costs can 
be attributed to 77% of the accidents where rotorcraft experience significant damage and 
without being destroyed.  The high average of fatality costs indicates that fatalities are the 
more likely outcome of CFIT accidents over injuries, and the NTSB has estimated that 
this is the outcome in 60 percent of these accidents (Sandel Avionics, 2012).  
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 Technology costs.  In order to generate a positive ROI, the results show that the 
CFIT-avoidance technology adoption costs, especially for the piston category operators, 
ranging from as low as $9,946 to as high $29,847 (Table 7) should remain relatively low 
when compared to the accident costs to be avoided.  It should be noted that these costs 
could be much higher when different pieces of equipment are integrated into the same 
aircraft and if the integration is done by the equipment manufacturer, a vendor, or the 
rotorcraft OEM.  The GTN 650/750 system with moving maps and HTAWS enabled, as 
an example, provides more capability at a higher cost.  For piston category rotorcraft, the 
radar altimeters, with costs as low as $9.946 (Table 7), would provide the best value for 
operators, and having been already been mandated for Part 135 operations (FAA, 2014a; 
2015), the possibility of even lower costs exists.  The higher equipment maintenance 
costs, CM, in Table 7, averaging around $12,000, were primarily driven by the software 
updates required over the life of the equipment.  The repair or replacement costs were 
found to be relatively low as a result of the high average MTBF of the equipment at 7,425 
flight hours.  The ROI results show that the technology adoption costs ideally should not 
increase by more than a factor of three.  
An increase in the CT for the CFIT-avoidance technology for the piston and single 
turbine categories, even with a positive ROI, could rise to levels that would impact its 
rate of integration into the fleet.  With the current adoption costs ranging from $9,946 to 
$29,847 (Table 7) being increased by a factor of 10, the analysis shows a positive ROI is 
unlikely to be achieved (Figure 24).  The rise in the costs to a minimum of $99,460 could 
become unmanageable as it would represent 35% of the value of a new R22 or 22% of a 
new R44 in 2015.  In simulations where the technology costs were continuously 
increased, it was observed that a positive ROI would not be achieved when the costs 
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increased by more than a factor of three.  As Tang (2006) suggested in his research, the 
adoption of new safety technology is influenced by the opinion of leaders and 
stakeholders, and rising or high costs could lead to a negative opinion. 
 Accident rate.  The piston category of rotorcraft had the highest accident rate at 
0.56 per 100,000 flight hours over the period of interest (Figure 11) followed by the 
single turbine at 0.27.  In terms of individual accidents, single turbine was the highest 
with 56 against the piston’s 46 (Table 8).  Based on the operations identified in Figure 9, 
these accident rotorcrafts were mostly used for personal travel, farming activities, and 
low altitude observation operations.  These operations are undertaken by individuals or 
small fleet operators.  At the current accident rate, rotorcraft in the piston and single 
turbine category are projected to be involved in 46 and 64 accidents respectively, during 
the next ten-year period between 2017 and 2026, as shown in Table 8.  This shows a 
marked increase in the possible single turbine accidents, while piston will remain 
relatively flat.  Some accidents in the single turbine category, similar to the twin turbine, 
will be mitigated with the new requirement for Part 135 rotorcraft to have radio 
altimeters, but broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance equipment is still needed to 
drastically reduce the overall number of rotorcraft accidents.  Twin-turbine rotorcraft 
accidents were seen to occur at a lower frequency, 0.16 per 100,000 flight hours (Figure 
11) and will increase modestly over the same ten-year period to 12.  With the number of 
piston and twin-turbine accidents remaining flat or increasing slightly, the industry would 
experience similar levels of losses as the previous 10-year period.  The increase in single-
turbine accidents by 8 and the potential to achieve a positive ROI with a median value of 
18 supports the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance equipment.  
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Conclusions 
This study was undertaken in order to propose and apply a method of estimating 
the potential ROI that can be achieved with the broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance 
equipment and to determine whether the results supported doing so.  The methodology 
expanded on work previously done by Cavka & Cokorilo (2012) where they performed a 
CBA of aircraft safety based on the A320-200 aircraft.  The rotorcraft industry or operators 
are more likely to experience a positive ROI in all rotorcraft categories.  With a median 
value ranging from 3 for the twin-turbines on the lower end and 19 for turbine-singles on 
the higher end, the results indicate a positive ROI is more likely to be achieved.  Key to 
the positive ROI is the management of the technology costs. With 50% of the ROI values 
for all rotorcraft being between two and nine, the results are consistent with the expected 
2.66 ROI from the estimated costs and benefits of Canada’s Department of Transport 
(2011) mandate of the adoption of TAWS equipment.  The study therefore supports the 
broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology.  
The study applied cost categories identified in the ASTER research by the 
National Aerospace Laboratory (2001), and it was applicable to accidents involving airline 
aircraft.  It was observed that there was limited information on rotorcraft accident costs, and 
for the study, it was necessary to add comments on how each category would be evaluated 
for inclusion into the analysis.  For the evaluation of the ROI, it was also observed that some 
cost categories would have to be considered societal costs and excluded or covered under 
indirect costs since they could not be individually quantified.  When commencing the study, 
it was concluded that the study would be a starting point for the evaluation of rotorcraft 
technology ROI, and future improvements though research would be required. 
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This research was performed in order to fill a research gap in the literature 
surrounding ROI for safety improvements.  Although similar ROI research had been 
performed, it focused more on operations than aircraft equipment and technology.  The 
Network Occupational Safety and Health Group’s software, ROHSEI, is used for health, 
safety, and environmental ROI analysis.  The FAA and Booze, Allen, Hamilton Consulting 
developed the ROI for human factors safety interventions (Johnson and Avers, 2012).  
Aviation related research on safety interventions was performed as cost-benefit analyses, and 
focus was on societal costs.  This research has shown that the industry can use ROI to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of a safety intervention and make the decision on whether to 
invest in adopting it rather than waiting for a regulatory mandate. 
Limitations of the Study 
The study had limitations that could not be eliminated from the research design 
but were not considered to significantly impact the conclusions drawn from the results of 
the analysis.  To estimate the technology adoption costs, the size of the fleet that would 
need to install the equipment should be known.  It was difficult to accurately estimate the 
size of the fleet that had already installed the equipment.  Regulatory authorities in some 
cases drive safety improvements by changing or introducing new rotorcraft certification 
and operation requirements to require the adoption of new technology.  For example, the 
analysis of the accidents by FAR description (Figure 10) showed that 60% of CFIT 
related accidents over this period occurred during Part 91 general aviation operations.  
The new CFR Part 14 §135.160 radio altimeter for rotorcraft operations rule that came 
into effect in April 2017 would not affect all Part 91 operators, and only by their 
voluntary installation of the altimeters would their risk of CFIT accidents be minimized 
(FAA 2014a, 2014b; 2014c).  With the introduction of the altimeter rule, only 11 of the 
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67 aircraft operating under Part 91 would have been required to install the equipment.  
Since the actual number of operators that could install the CFIT-avoidance equipment as 
part of the new regulations could not be estimated, a range of 25 to 75 percent of the fleet 
was used for the simulation.  This ensures that the simulation results reflect the potential 
ROI values more likely to be achieved.    
The estimation of the accident safety costs also posed a limitation.  It was 
assumed that the costs of adopting the CFIT-avoidance technology could vary over time 
and were therefore limited to the time of extraction regardless of the source and method 
of extraction.  As a key factor to a higher ROI, the CT, which will vary from customer to 
customer, are based on the rotorcrafts’ age, rotorcraft variants, avionics architecture, 
maintenance costs, and technology compatibility.  It was assumed that the technology 
could be integrated into all aircraft in their current design or minor modifications would 
be required.  The results showed that occupant fatality (CF), occupant injury (CI), loss of 
use costs (CL), and aircraft damage (CD) costs were the main drivers of the ROI values, 
and a moderate fluctuation in the CT would not significantly alter the results.  The 
available data could not support the estimation of the magnitude of the variation of the CT 
based on the current or future fleet.  With this limitation in mind, the costs were escalated 
to identify a range through which an increase was acceptable before the ROI turned 
negative.  For every ROI analysis, the researcher will be limited by the available data on 
technology costs, especially when multiple types of equipment are considered.    
The decision to use a ratio of direct to indirect costs of 1:1 in a similar manner to 
previous research done by Manuele (2011) and OSHA (2007) research to estimate the 
indirect costs could limit the understanding of how the individual cost categories 
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influence the ROI.  The lack of data on the average costs for search and rescue, accident 
investigations, loss of investment with increased insurance costs, third party damage, and 
loss of reputation led to the assumption that direct costs were the major drivers.  
Additionally, the loss of baggage category was considered not to be applicable due to the 
limited amount of luggage passengers in rotorcrafts are likely to carry which also limits 
the scope of the cost categories.  In future studies, the researcher should quantify the 
costs associated with cargo that may not necessarily be considered baggage such as 
offshore supplies, skiing equipment, medical supplies on HAA aircraft, and power line 
inspection equipment, all of which are not considered part of the airframe.  Quantifying 
these costs will improve the quality of the ROI analysis results. 
Another limitation of the study was the inability to factor out the impact of other 
safety initiatives on CFIT accident reduction.  The accident reports did not explicitly state 
that the installation of CFIT-avoidance could have prevented the accident, and it was 
therefore not possible to estimate what percentage of accidents could be avoided over the 
next ten years purely as a result of installing the equipment.  Additionally, the study was 
limited to the technologies that were recommended by the NLR (2014).  The use of other 
equipment such as tail rotor cameras to prevent tail rotor strikes was not factored in.  For 
the study, it was therefore assumed that the recommended equipment would be more 
likely to help prevent the accident.  The results from the study therefore do not offer 
insight into other potential factors that may affect the ROI from an operations 
perspective.  
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Recommendations 
 This study was intended to provide a method of estimating the potential ROI that 
could be achieved with the broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology and 
evaluating the same.  The study applied accident cost categories originally defined for 
large fixed wing or airline category aircraft in the ASTER project report (NLR, 2001) 
which acknowledged that the existing methodologies did not allow for effective cost-
benefit assessment.  The report determined that the most significant determinants of 
accident costs arising from aircraft accidents and incidents were aircraft damage, deaths 
and injuries suffered by occupants, and loss of reputation.  The findings from this study 
on accident costs were consistent with those of the NLR report with occupant deaths and 
injuries and aircraft damage being the main determinants, but rotorcraft leasing costs 
were seen to be a more significant contributor than loss of reputation for rotorcrafts.  This 
suggests that the methodology herein can be applied as a starting point for understanding 
the financial implications in terms of ROI for new or existing safety technology.  The 
methodology should be validated by evaluating the ROI of other initiatives such as safety 
management systems, human factors, and automation. 
 In this study, there were three major implications.  First, it was determined early 
in the study that there was a need to split the rotorcraft into three categories to get a better 
understanding of the ROI results.  These categories were: piston, turbine-single, and 
turbine-twin.  When compared to the study done by Cavka & Cokorilo (2012) for airline 
aircraft, only two categories, narrow or wide-body, were required.  Using three categories for 
this study was not only influenced by the aircraft capacity but also a combination of potential 
certification and operational requirements.  For the piston and turbine-single rotorcraft, some 
of the technology would likely be considered optional kits while on turbine-twins they could 
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be offered as part of the standard configuration.  Second, it was observed that the evaluation 
of certain accident cost categories will be needed.  Not all the cost categories were applicable 
to rotorcraft accidents and had to be excluded with applicable explanations.  As an example, 
airport closure costs were excluded as most CFIT accidents do not occur near airports, while 
site contamination and clearance were considered societal costs.  Additionally, the indirect 
costs such as third party damage, loss of reputation, and cost of accident investigation were 
estimated using the direct costs.  This study suggests that further research into the rotorcraft 
accident cost categories and their applicable values is required to fully understand the ROI 
likely to be achieved for safety interventions as they are introduced.  Third, the study showed 
that for the industry, a key factor to a higher ROI was ensuring that the technology adoption 
costs, CT, remain low.  The CT will vary from customer to customer and for the industry as a 
whole based on the rotorcraft fleet’s age, variants, avionics architecture, ease of installation, 
maintenance costs, and technology compatibility.  The analysis assumed that the technology 
could be integrated into all aircraft in their current design or with minor modifications 
required.  Of importance will be the industry’s ability to ensure that the technology adoption 
costs for all operators remains relatively low and within reach of individual or small fleet 
operators by developing low cost variants, training methods, and maintenance options.  
A review of the ROI results shows that the industry should adopt the CFIT-avoidance 
technology more broadly for piston and turbine-single category rotorcraft.  Operators may 
not need to spend additional resources to reduce the number of CFIT accidents for the twin-
turbine category.  There may be a need to use alternative methods such as improved safety 
risk management (SRM) training for crew to further reduce the CFIT accidents.  Of the 10 
twin turbine accidents, 8 were involved in HAA operations at the time of the accident.  The 
adoption of the new HAA regulations (FAA, 2014a) should provide a CFIT accident 
reduction.  For any further reduction beyond HAA operations, SRM training could address 
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the operational pitfalls or behavioral traps that the FAA has identified as accident inducing 
such as continuing VFR into instrument conditions, Get-There-Itis, and loss of 
positional/situational awareness (FAA, 2008; FAA, 2009b).  With twin-turbines likely to 
experience an ROI with a median value of 2 and IQR of 5 plus the impact of the HAA 
regulations, it is recommended that operators will be better served by investing in SRM 
training for their crew. 
 Contribution to the literature.  This study, which briefly introduced the background 
of how the costs and benefits of aviation safety initiatives have been previously evaluated, 
has made several significant contributions to the literature where gaps exist.  In previous 
research, the CBA methodology, in which the government or public perspective is 
considered, was applied.  The ROI methodology applied herein goes beyond what has 
been done with CBAs for various aviation safety initiatives.  It evaluates the costs and 
benefits for the industry from an investors’ or operators’ perspective.  The methodology 
expands on previous research performed by Cavka & Cokorilo (2012), where they 
performed a CBA of aircraft safety based on the A320-200 aircraft.  The ROI considers 
the costs that operators are likely to avoid when a reduction in CFIT accidents is 
achieved.  The study contributes to rotorcraft research by proposing a method of 
estimating rotorcraft accident or safety costs not previously done and provides a 
theoretical framework on which future ROI evaluations can be done.  The study provides 
an understanding of the cost categories that drive rotorcraft accident costs: deaths and 
injuries suffered by occupants, aircraft damage, and leasing costs.  This was in contrast to 
one of the expected drivers for airline aircraft, loss of reputation. 
The study also provides a basis on which refinements to the methodology can be 
made using current resources such as the Aircraft BlueBook®, HeliValue$, Inc. 
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Helicopter Blue Book, rotorcraft OEMS, regulators, and safety equipment vendors.  The 
study identifies that indirect costs are difficult to estimate since the data is not publicly 
available or it’s difficult for the OEMS and regulators to quantify as they may not always 
be involved in all incident and accident investigations.  The average cost of accident 
investigations for the regulators or OEMs were not quantifiable, but the study used the 
direct to indirect costs ratio of 1:1 as a starting point for future research.  This study calls 
for the examination of similar costs to facilitate future ROI analysis.  Additionally, the 
use of this methodology as described can provide results that can complement the 
findings of a CBA done by the government or industry to support the implementation of 
given safety initiatives, for example, the Canadian Department of Transport’s decision to 
amend the aviation regulations to facilitate the wider adoption of TAWS (Department of 
Transport, 2011).  
Another contribution to the literature is that this study utilizes the rotorcraft 
categories to provide insight into the potential ROI.  Some previous safety studies have 
used the type of operations according to the Federal Air Regulations description or by 
industry affected.  For example, observations on CFIT accidents in the HEMS/HAA 
industry by Ishihara (2005) and Part 27 rotorcraft by the HAI, AHS, and GAMA (Sandel 
Avionics, 2012).  The findings of the study contribute to the literature by showing that 
the ROI for a given rotorcraft category may be impacted by the regulations that have 
been or are likely to be mandated.  It demonstrates that the relationship between the ROI 
and mandated regulations for safety initiatives needs to be understood not only by 
operational segment but also by rotorcraft category.  In this case, the new HAA 
regulations with respect to TAWS may potentially reduce the number of accidents, and 
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investing in CFIT-avoidance technology beyond HAA operations for twin-turbines may 
result in a negative ROI.  
Practical implications.  The study provides recommendations which will 
improve the estimation of the ROI for current and future safety initiatives.  The 
recommendations are based on the findings of the study which adopted the cost 
categories identified in the ASTER project report (NLR,2001).  The recommendations 
address gaps identified within the analysis. 
Improving the methodology.  The current study applied accident cost categories 
originally defined for large fixed wing or airline category aircraft in the ASTER project 
report (NLR, 2001).  Cavka & Cokorilo (2012) applied the same categories for a cost-
benefit assessment on A320 accidents.  The NLR report acknowledged that the existing 
methodologies did not allow for effective cost-benefit assessment, and therefore the 
methodology used in this study should be improved for future studies.  Improvements 
should be made by determining the applicability of the different cost categories as direct 
or indirect costs and the values that should be used.  The cost categories may include:  
a) Airline costs for delay: For rotorcraft operations where timing is critical 
such as HAA, scheduled flights or on-demand taxi, it should be 
determined whether the cost impact of delays is high enough to warrant its 
inclusion in future ROI analyses.  The delay costs include the reallocation 
of another aircraft to cover the trip, the management of customers before 
alternate aircraft is provided, etc. 
b) Loss of baggage: This cost for this study was considered negligible.  
Consideration should be given for non-aircraft equipment that is lost such 
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as medical bags and supplies for HAA, cargo for off-shore ops, and 
chemical spray for agricultural applications.  The costs incurred in such 
losses can be categorized with loss of baggage for a more accurate model.   
c) Search and rescue costs: These costs whether incurred by the operator, 
OEMs, or the local emergency services should be quantified for future 
research.  This study showed that a large percentage of CFIT accidents 
occurred in VMC and near land, but for other studies where the majority 
of the operations may be offshore or in remote locations, it would be 
useful to know the SAR costs.   
d) Airline immediate response: When a catastrophic accident occurs, a 
rotorcraft operator assists the immediate families, colleagues, and the 
members of society where the accident occurred to deal with the 
aftermath.  Additionally, the operator handles some of the communication 
of critical information on how the post-accident events are being handled 
to the same individuals and members of the media.  This immediate 
response comes with additional costs.  These should be evaluated by 
rotorcraft category for the industry.  
e) Costs of accident investigation: Rotorcraft OEMS, operators, and 
regulators are usually involved in incident and accident investigations.  
The degree of their involvement is based on the outcomes.  For example, 
OEMs expertise may be required to understand the rotorcraft’s design and 
failure modes of a given system.  When the occurrence is a minor 
accident, the FAA or NTSB may choose to delegate the investigation to 
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the OEM or industry experts.  For the ROI, the industry should evaluate 
the average costs to the OEM or operators to support the investigations for 
each rotorcraft category.  
f) Loss of reputation: This includes the loss of investment income costs.  
Accidents can result in the loss of reputation for the airframe or engine 
manufacturer or the operator.  When customers view either party as having 
an unsafe product or operations, customers will not engage with them.  
OEMs should evaluate the financial impact of accidents to their 
reputation. 
Technology adoption costs.  One of the recommendations for the industry was to 
ensure that the technology adoption costs, CT, remain relatively low to increase the 
likelihood of a positive ROI.  The results of the study showed that the CT should not 
increase by a factor of more than three.  Previous research shows that the adoption of 
technology will be driven by some of the exogenous factors identified by Venkatesh, 
Thong, and Xu (2012) and Tang (2006) such as the price value, operators’ needs, ease of 
integration and use, expected performance of the equipment, and whether other users 
recommend the use of the equipment or social influence.  The industry or operators will 
need to evaluate the different technologies against their operations, the rotorcraft, the 
pilots’ proficiency, financial resources, and the level of capabilities they would desire and 
adopt which will not increase costs significantly for any category or all rotorcraft.  Based 
on this factor, the industry should explore ways of reducing or maintaining the 
technology costs as low as possible as it will be a key factor for operators.  
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Recommendations for Future Research  
 This research provided a framework for estimating the potential ROI that could be 
achieved with the broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance technologies.  Future research 
should study the accuracy of the model by using safety data for implemented safety 
technologies or solutions.  For example, the adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology for 
fixed wing aircraft or the introduction of a safety management system or quality 
assurance maintenance program could be studied and the ROI evaluated.  The results 
from the estimated and actual ROI achieved will provide a better understanding of how 
the methodology can be improved.  Additionally, the methodology should be improved to 
support the study of a specific category of aircraft.  For the study, the methodology was 
adopted from Cavka and Cokorilo’s (2012) study of airline aircraft to reflect rotorcraft 
accident costs.  Future research can focus on quantifying the accident costs associated with 
not only general aviation aircraft but both manned and unmanned.  This will allow operators, 
especially fleet operators, to make a quick assessment on the financial impact of adopting 
new or emerging technologies broadly and also evaluate the impact of regulations introduced 
by regulators based on their CBA assessment. 
The industry should make improvements on the ROI estimation method applied 
herein by defining or proposing better processes of estimating rotorcraft accident costs.  
In this study, consideration was given to the replacement costs of pilots, but a more 
definitive model would require the consideration of other personnel such as law 
enforcement officers, flight nurses, news producers, and firefighters, among others, who 
may be lost in the accidents.  In addition to the staff replacement costs that would be 
incurred by the organization, significant amounts of resources will be invested in getting 
the new personnel to the same level of experience.  Though these individuals may not be 
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in aviation roles, the industry will bear the costs involved in replacing them in their 
respective organizations, and the services they provide are likely to become more 
expensive.  Other costs to the rotorcraft industry such as the organizations’ immediate 
response to the accidents, costs of supporting accident investigations led by the NTSB or 
FAA, increased cost of insurance due the recurrence of the same type of accidents, and 
loss of reputation will need to be defined or estimated.  Helicopter accidents, like all 
aviation accidents, can have a negative impact to a community especially if the industry 
is the primary economic activity.  The overall economic impact should also be estimated.  
Some of these costs in the study were estimated as indirect costs in a 1:1 ratio to direct 
costs based on research previously performed by Manuele (2011) and OSHA (2007).  
Having more accurate cost estimates will improve the industry’s understanding of the 
financial impact of adopting different technologies and will drive better decision making 
and strategic approach to technology development. 
The rotorcraft industry should adopt the proposed ROI estimation methodology 
and apply it to other safety initiatives.  In the same manner that a CBA was performed for 
accident safety costs for airline aircraft (Cavka & Cokorilo, 2012), airport security (Stewart 
& Mueller, 2013), aviation security (Stewart & Mueller, 2014), and U.K. offshore helicopter 
industry (Mitchell, 2006), an ROI can be performed for each safety initiative to help the 
industry understand the impact the financial resources proactively invested in safety would 
have.  Safety investments would therefore be driven by the industry rather than regulations 
which may take a longer time to be adopted or implemented.  In May 2017, during the 
HeliOffshore Conference, Andrea Cicero, the then Managing Director of Babcock Mission 
Critical Services, acknowledged that demonstrating a ROI has been historically challenging 
due to the need for comprehensive safety and financial data (Cicero, 2017).  Though this 
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methodology provides a starting point for estimating the ROI, future research should be used 
to refine data on the various safety or accident costs, both direct and indirect, and to make it 
more accessible to the rest of the industry for analysis.  For example, understanding the costs 
associated with accident investigations for both the airframe OEMs, operators, and the 
regulatory authorities would give a more accurate ROI estimate. 
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